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 Abstract 
 
This dissertation consists of three essays analyzing how patenting firms and external 
investors value the knowledge describe in the patent document. A patent is a document 
that bestows a temporary exclusivity right (20 years from the filing date) over the 
described invention. In the patent document, one can find information about assignees, 
inventors, application date, priority date, a list of prior art (backward citations), the 
invention technological classification, and the claims describing the invention. 
Therefore, a patent disclose a rich set of information, which might reveal a firm’s 
valuable technological information and be used by competitors. Therefore, I study the 
patenting firm valuation of the information conveyed by the patent and how external 
investors value the patented knowledge. 
In the first chapter, I study publicly firms’ motivations to delay patent disclosure. 
The enactment of the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA), in November 29, 
2000, required U.S. patent applicants to have their patent application published 18 
months after filing date but allowed them to opt for keeping it secret if they relinquished 
foreign patent protection. Using a sample of granted patents applied for by publicly 
traded companies, between 2000 and 2009, I investigate what drives large companies’ 
decision to keep a patent secret up to grant. Particularly, in this chapter I investigate the 
effect of technological crowdedness, strategic use of in-house knowledge stock, and 
invention radicalness on the decision of opting out of pre-grant publication. Results 
show a negative association between technological crowdedness and pre-grant secrecy, 
while radicalness and the use of in-house knowledge stock are positively associated 
with the likelihood of a patent application being secret until grant. 
In the second chapter, we use an event study methodology to investigate whether the 
stock market values innovation milestones. First, we investigate abnormal returns 
generated due to a patent grant event. Results point to investors, on average, not valuing 
the information disclosed in the patent document. We then test several explanations 
about why investors do not value patent grants on average: patent value is highly 
skewed, the number of patents granted is ever increasing and only some patents protect 
technology that results in successful products. By analyzing stock market reaction to the 
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approval of a drug by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), we show that the 
stock market is able to value innovation that results in a product. This suggests that 
innovation that will clearly generate sales revenue in the short run are highly valued by 
investors. We point out some implications of these results. 
Finally, in the third chapter, I look at the effect of firm’s technological 
diversification on firm value (Tobin’s q). Firm’s technological knowledge base 
contributes to identifying technological opportunities and answering demand changes. 
Therefore, a firm with broader technology base might be better able to cope with 
technology uncertainties achieving higher future returns. Technological classes of the 
firm’s patents were used to calculate an entropy index of technological diversification. 
Using a sample of 1,304 R&D intensive US firms over 16 years (1992-2007) I find that 
on average technological diversification has a positive and significant impact on firm 
value. Further, diving into industry level differences, results indicate that technological 
diversification matters to investors’ assessment of firm’s future cash flows in the 
electronic industry. On the other hand, in the chemical industry, technological 
diversification does not have a significant effect on Tobin’s q.  
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Chapter 1 
Why are they hiding? Patent secrecy and 
patenting strategies 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
A patent provides a mechanism to protect inventors from competitors’ imitation of 
their invention in exchange for a detailed disclosure of the patented invention so that 
any interested and skilled audience may be able to understand and replicate the 
knowledge conveyed by the patent document. The temporary exclusivity right bestowed 
by the patent rights urges inventors to strategically manage their patents  to maximize 
the profits generated by the invention (Jell, 2011) and to sustain a competitive 
advantage that may be derived from the innovation (Teece, 1986). 
The literature on patenting strategies focuses on the motivations driving the strategic 
uses, filing (Jell, 2011; Van Zeebroeck, 2009) and management of patents (Somaya, 
2012). According to de Rassenfosse et al. (2008) and Jell (2011), in addition to the 
traditional motive to protect an invention against competitors’ imitation, motives to 
patent include: blocking others, securing freedom to operate, and enhancing reputation. 
On the strategic management of patents, Somaya (2012) singles out some issues such as 
“signaling and information disclosure strategies, managing patents as real options, 
nonmarket strategies, and patent-related managerial capabilities” (Somaya, p. 1086, 
2012). Filing strategies are related to procedural choices made by patentees in filing 
their patent applications.  These choices may accelerate or delay the grant of a patent. 
Van Zeebroeck (2009) identifies patent filing strategies – the craft of a patent by making 
it longer and cumbersome to examiners to evaluate the patent, international filings, and 
the filing of divisional patents.  
This study contributes to the patent filing strategies literature by analyzing 
patentees’ decision, when filing a patent application, to delay the disclosure of the 
patent document. Enacted on November 29, 2000, the American Inventors Protection 
Act (AIPA) established the automatic publication of US patent applications 18 months 
after the earliest filing date1. Nonetheless, an inventor may choose to have the patent 
application secret up to grant2. However, this choice poses a trade-off: having the patent 
application secret up to grant requires relinquishing foreign patent protection. The AIPA 
law harmonized US patent law with international patent law. Although patentees faced 
1 Patent applications filed in a foreign jurisdiction were published by the foreign patent office before 
AIPA enactment; however, AIPA established the patent application publication by the US Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) making patent applications available in the US at the same time they are 
published abroad. 
2 AIPA’s opt out option requires applicants to certify that the invention disclosed in the application will 
not be subject of an application in another country or under an international multilateral agreement that 
requires publication 18 months after the filing date (35 U.S. Code § 122) 
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international publication before AIPA – when filing an international patent application, 
after AIPA this decision has to be taken together with the patent filing. In addition, in 
case the patentee wants to withdraw an intitial pre-grant publication choice, this is 
associated with nontrivial costs (Graham and Hedge, 20153). 
The option to keep the patent secret until grant was justified as a mechanism to 
protect small US inventors who may not have enough resources to protect themselves 
against competitors’ imitation (Ragusa, 1992; Johnson and Popp, 2001; Graham and 
Hedge, 2012), because usually small inventors have limited resources to identify patent 
infringers and sue them. Graham and Hedge (2012) in their analysis of successful US 
patent applications filed between 1996 and 2005 find that 7.5% of the applications filed 
during 2001 and 2005 chose pre-grant secrecy. Interestingly, small inventors are not 
more likely to opt out than large ones (Graham and Hedge, 2012, 2015). 
In this study, I investigate what drives large companies to opt out of pre-grant 
publication. In my sample of patents applied for by publicly traded firms, about 8.15% 
of the granted patents, during 2001 and 2010, were opted out of earlier patent 
application publication. Moreover, patents that were opted out of patent application 
publication had, on average, 20 months more secrecy time than those published pre-
grant. 
Choosing pre-grant application publication allows patentees to pursue foreign patent 
protection. Graham and Hedge (2012) report that 51% of US patent applications filed 
between January 1, 1995 and November 28, 2000, were also applied for in a foreign 
country. Unsurprisingly, inventors are more likely to seek foreign patent protection for 
their valuable inventions (Graham and Hedge, 2012). Moreover, earlier publication 
allows the patent owner, once the patent is granted, the right to seek reasonable royalties 
from the publication date to the grant (Hedge and Luo, 2016). Thus, inventors may be 
willing to have the application disclosed before the grant of the patent right in order to 
benefit from earlier royalty revenues and foreign patent protection.   
In addition to foreign patent protection, patentees derive value from patent 
application publication as it signals firms’ innovation capabilities (Hsu and Ziedonis, 
2007; Ganglmair and Oh, 2014) and may preempt R&D rivals from introducing a 
substitute innovation and competing with the patenting firm (Ceccagnoli, 2008). 
Moreover, pre-grant publication of a patent application may assist managers, of 
3 Online Supplementary Materials. 
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competitor firms, in making more informed decisions about R&D investment and 
avoiding hold up (FTC, 2003). Additionally, as AIPA aims to harmonize US patent law 
with the patent system of other developed economies4, pre-grant publication may be 
driven by (especially multinational) firms’ willingness to conform to international 
standards. Furthermore, pre-grant publication fosters knowledge disclosure, increases 
business certainty and promotes rational planning (FTC, 2005). 
Conversely, AIPA’s opt out option provides an opportunity to, to some extent, 
combine secrecy and the exclusivity right allowing for strategic use of a combination of 
formal and informal intellectual property (IP) protection (Graham, 2004; Schneider and 
Veugelers, 2013). Foregoing earlier publication gives patentees more time to develop 
the invention without having the patent application disclosed. Pre-grant secrecy might 
give inventors a competitive advantage as competitors have access to the invention in a 
detailed5 way only when the uncertainty regarding the patent award is solved 
favorably6, hindering imitation and inventing around activities. Indeed, the major 
argument against patenting is that the knowledge disclosed in the patent document may 
give valuable information to competitors undermining innovators’ profits (Scotchmer 
and Green, 1990) and stimulating competitors to design around the patent (FTC, 2003). 
According to Anton and Yao (2004), disclosing enabling knowledge, included in the 
patent description, increases the probability of imitation or inventing around the 
patented invention. 
In evaluating publicly traded firms’ choice to opt out of earlier patent application 
publication, the present study shows that not only invention characteristics but also 
strategic concerns are relevant to the decision to keep the patent application secret up to 
grant. Furthermore, I propose that companies’ filing strategy of keeping the patent 
application secret up to grant, takes into account the competition the technology faces, 
the hazard of disclosing firm’s internal valuable knowledge, and the invention specific 
characteristics. Results show that there is a negative association between technological 
crowdedness and pre-grant secrecy, whereas the more radical an invention the more 
4 Most of industrialized economies, like Japan and European countries, have adopted the 18 months 
publication rule long before it was implemented in U.S. (Ragusa, 1992) 
5 “The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of 
making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art 
to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set 
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention” (35 U.S.C.112). 
6 Uncertainty is not totally mitigated by the patent grant as, after grant, U.S. patents can be challenged by 
litigation or by a patent re-examination requested to the USPTO (Graham et al., 2002; Lemley and 
Shapiro, 2005; Gans et al., 2008) 
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likely is the patent to be kept secret up to grant. Further, the more an invention builds on 
companies’ in-house knowledge stock7 the more likely it is to opt out of pre-grant 
patent application publication. 
 
1.2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
This section discusses the drivers of patentees’ decision regarding earlier application 
publication and derives some hypotheses. In particular, I discuss large entities’ 
incentives to disclose or not the inventions through earlier patent publication and how 
disclosing or not is linked to companies’ overall patenting strategies. 
When applying for a patent many factors may determine the earliest filing date8 and, 
therefore, the publication date. However, this study investigates the motivations to opt 
out of patent application pre-grant publication, which has to be stated together with the 
filing of the patent application.  
Assuming that firms maximize their profits (Arrow, 1962) then the choice of pre-
grant secrecy is made always when it yields higher returns than publishing the patent. 
Besides motives to keep an invention secret as profit maximizing, minimizing 
competition, or further developing the invention (Anderson, 2011), delaying disclosure 
reveals inventor’s believe that domestic (US) protection is enough. 
In choosing pre-grant secrecy, patentees may evaluate this choice considering three 
main aspects of the invention protected by the patent: the competition faced by the 
invention (technological crowdedness), firm’s technology strategy and how much 
internal knowledge the patent application publication discloses, and the invention 
specific characteristics (radicalness). 
 
Technological crowdedness 
Appropriating returns from an invention depends on the inventor’s ability to exclude 
others from making, using or selling the invention (Arrow, 1962). In case the invention 
is bound to be incorporated in a firm’s process or product, excluding competitors is an 
upmost requirement in order to achieve profits maximization. Therefore, the willingness 
7 In this chapter, I refer to in-house knowledge stock as the extent that a patent builds on a firm’s previous 
patents, relying on the knowledge generated inside the company. 
8 John F. Martin (August 3, 2015) points out several reasons why patent application publication may 
occur in less than 18 months or even in more time. http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/08/03/the-myth-of-
the-18-month-delay-in-publishing-patent-applications/id=60185/ - Access: September 11, 2016. 
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to patent depends on the effectiveness of the patent as an instrument to exclude and to 
appropriate returns from the innovation (Cohen et al., 2000).  
Even though a patent exclusivity right enables innovation returns appropriation, it 
has been shown in the empirical literature that managers mostly rely on informal 
innovation appropriability mechanisms such as secrecy, instead of on formal 
mechanisms such as patents (Cohen et al., 2000; Levin et al., 1987; Arundel, 2001). 
Zaby (2010) and Heger and Zaby (2013) stress that the invention disclosure required by 
the patent implies heterogeneous costs for the patenting firms. The former argues that an 
inventor’s propensity to patent depends on the extent of her technological lead, being 
more likely to rely on secrecy the more the inventor can appropriate monopoly rents 
without patent protection, i.e., the more difficult it is for a rival to imitate or reverse 
engineering the invention. The latter states that the propensity to patent depends on 
market barriers and on the relevance of the information disclosed. 
Patents, by requiring the disclosure of the invention, represent a huge threat to 
innovating firms and may shrink innovators’ competitive advantage and technological 
lead (Zaby, 2010). Opting-out of pre-grant patent application publication the patentee is 
delaying the disclosure of the invention, what in a higly competitive environment may 
give to the patentee similar benefits as secrecy. However, in case disclosure represent an 
important threat it is reasonable to expect that the inventor is going to opt for secrecy 
instead of delaying disclosure. 
On the other hand, the literature has identified a set of motives to patent beyond the 
traditional motive of protecting an invention against competitors’ imitation. These 
motives include: blocking competitors from using an invention (Cohen et al., 2000), 
securing freedom to operate (Henkel and Jell, 2009), gaining time to find a licensee or 
to evaluate an invention’s potential (Henkel and Jell, 2010), signaling the firm’s 
research capabilities (Hsu and Ziedonis, 2008; Ganglmair and Oh, 2014), and protecting 
a firm against infringing others’ patents and incurring infringement suit costs (Hall and 
Ziedonis, 2001).  
On patents as a tool to secure freedom to operate9 (Henkel and Pangerl, 2008; 
Henkel and Jell, 2009; Jell, 2011), Henkel and Pangerl (2008) interviewed 56 IP experts 
from Germany’s large companies asking about defensive publication strategies. The 
authors find that companies use publications such as peer-review journals, firm’s 
9 Jell (2011) defines freedom to operate as freedom to make and use the invention in the first place. 
 18 
                                                          
reports, and patents in order to establish prior art10 and secure freedom to operate, and 
then, hindering competitors from patenting similar technology (Jell, 2011). 
Parchomovski (2000) and Litchman et al. (2000) point to strategical disclosure of 
research results, where in a patent race, firms may disclose intermediate results in order 
to raise the patentability bar for competitors. When such research outcomes become 
publicly available, they may hinder novelty and nonobviusness11 of an otherwise 
patentable invention. 
Gilbert and Newbery (1982) have highlighted a strategic use of patents – incumbents 
preempt innovators from entering the market through patenting. According to the 
authors, preemptive patenting is a strategy to assure monopolistic profits. Furthermore, 
Ganglmair and Oh (2014) claim that by announcing a pending application the innovator 
(leader) may derive a value of deterrence, i.e., deterring the competitor (follower) from 
innovating if the threat of infringement is sufficiently strong, giving the leader a 
competitive advantage. 
On preemptive patenting, Gullec et al. (2012) use patent examination outcomes at the 
European Patent Office (EPO) to access patents applied for in order to preempt 
competitors. They find evidence of preemptive patent filing – patentees file patents that 
may not comply with patenting requirements (novelty and nonobviousness) but aim to 
block competitors, ensuring freedom to operate. Also empirically, Ceccagnoli (2008), 
using the Carnegie Mellon survey (CMS) (Cohen et al. 2000), shows that preemptive 
patenting improves R&D returns appropriability for incumbents, especially when they 
have greater market share, when there is a threat of market entry, or when the R&D 
competition is based on incremental innovations. 
Considering the AIPA’s option to opt out, patentees may be willing to have their 
patent published before grant, deriving value from preempting competitors from 
inventing a similar invention. Earlier publication does not mean that the patent will be 
granted. However, by publishing the patent application it signals, to rivals, patentee’s 
research developments and may stop competitors from investing in the same 
10 Prior art refers to the knowledge publicly available at the time the patent is applied for. For an 
invention to be patented it has to be novel and non-obvious. Novel means that the invention has not 
been patented before and under the non-obviousness bar, an invention cannot be patented if "the 
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the 
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person 
having ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter pertains" (35 USC § 103a).  
11 35 U.S.C. § 102 and 35 U.S.C. § 103, respectively. 
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technological area (Litchman et al., 2000). In addition, pre-grant patent application 
publication, besides disclosing private information, bears the uncertainty regarding the 
award of the property right and it may also add uncertainty to the marketplace regarding 
the rights entitled to the patent (Van Zeebroeck, 2011). 
If the invention belongs to a technological area where the competition faced is high, 
publishing the patent application the patentee may derive a higher value by preempting 
rivals or securing freedom to operate than keeping the invention secret. Therefore, if the 
patentee is operating in a crowded technological area (in which there are many 
competitors inventing), she may be willing to publish the patent application before the 
patent is granted. Following the above argument, the first hypothesis states that:  
 
Hypothesis 1:  Firms are less likely to opt out of pre-grant publication of a 
patent application if the technology space is more crowded. 
 
Firm’s internal knowledge 
When designing patent filing strategies to maximize invention’s returns, inventors 
might consider the trade-off imposed by AIPA. By forgoing pre-grant publication an 
assignee also forgoes foreign patenting, i.e., foreign patent protection and the revenues 
she can get from the exclusivity right or licensing it out in another country. Balancing 
this trade-off, a patented invention that relies on firms in-house knowledge stock might 
influence firms’ disclosure choice in two opposite directions.  
On the one hand, an invention that builds on firm’s internal knowledge indicates that 
the firm has an advantage at follow-on innovations as the firm has already developed 
the underlying tacit knowledge. Then, having internal expertise that probably involves 
tacit knowledge, the published knowledge is protected in the sense that the tacit part is 
necessary in order to replicate the invention. Therefore, there is no danger on publishing 
the patent application because of this protection. 
On the other hand, earlier patent application publication reveals a firm’s technology 
direction without the assurance of exclusivity rights, giving to competitors the 
possibility to invent around or to imitate it. In this case, if the invention builds on 
external knowledge, there is a higher likelihood that others detect similar directions 
using this knowledge by their own means. However, if the patented invention relies 
more on a firm internal knowledge, by publishing the patent the firm might reveal 
interesting directions to use the firm’s knowledge. 
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In this sense, a follow-on invention might be kept secret until the patent grant in 
order to protect a core invention or to mask firm’s innovative and research direction. 
Moreover, publishing the patent without the exclusivity right might put at risk firm’s 
competitive advantage, even more when the invention relies on internal knowledge. 
Tacitness also means that the invention can be kept secret more effectively, i.e., an 
inventor would probably prefer to keep it secret if the patent is finally not granted 
Graham (2004) shows that firms inventing upon internal knowledge and valuing 
secrecy as an appropriability mechanism are more likely to delay the invention 
disclosure. Therefore, a firm building on its own knowledge may forgo earlier patent 
application publication, hiding internal knowledge and postponing spillovers from the 
application disclosure. By hiding its technology direction, choosing patent application 
pre-grant secrecy, a firm might secure or increase its competitive advantage as 
competitors get to knowing later in which direction the firm is innovating. This 
motivates hypothesis 2: 
  
Hypothesis 2. Relying on internal knowledge has a positive effect on the 
likelihood of a patent application to be opted out of pre-grant publication. 
 
Radicalness and technology uncertainty 
Besides firms’ strategies and technology characteristics, invention specific 
characteristics also might influence firms’ choice of opting out of earlier patent 
application publication. Moreover, the decision to keep the invention secret up to the 
patent grant comes once the decision to patent the invention is made. Keeping the patent 
application secret assures that the invention will be disclosed when the uncertainty 
regarding the patent grant is favorably solved.  
In addition to the property right uncertainty, patentees bear the uncertainty associated 
with the patented technology, the patent value, and the market for the protected 
invention (Somaya, 2012). The further the invention departs from the knowledge and 
capabilities established inside the firm and in the industry, the greater the uncertainty 
and the risk, requiring the adoption of new technical skills and routines (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Schoenmakers and Duyster, 2010). Likewise, inventions are said to be 
radical, as opposed to incremental, when they significantly differ from the state-of-the-
art technology. Hence, a radical invention means moving away from established 
techniques to a new combination of knowledge (Fleiming, 2001). Hurmelinna-
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Laukkanen et al. (p.5, 2013) argue that “when the creation to be protected is notably 
different from earlier ones, lead time, secrecy, or tacitness, for instance, are effective 
forms of protection since it takes more time for others to overcome causal ambiguities 
related to the innovation”. Therefore, the uncertainty borne by radical inventions might 
prevent firms from pre-grant publication, opting to have more time to further develop 
the technology before it is disclosed. Accordingly, hypothesis 3a states: 
 
Hypothesis 3a. Radicalness has a positive effect on the likelihood of a patent to 
be opted out of pre-grant publication. 
 
On the other hand, market uncertainty might prompt inventors to publish a radical 
invention before grant. To accelerate the adoption and the development of 
complementary assets, companies with radical inventions may be willing to disclose the 
invention. Innovating firms may profit from free revealing the invention by accelerating 
innovation diffusion and user adoption (Harhoff et al., 2003b). 
Furthermore, radical inventions are more complex and might be more difficult to 
imitate (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen et al., 2008); therefore, pre-grant publication may be 
less of a concern regarding returns appropriability. In addition, earlier publication 
allows foreign patenting, broadening invention geographical span. Based on this, the 
following hypothesis presents the opposite prediction to the former one: 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Radicalness has a negative effect on the likelihood of a patent to 
be opted out of pre-grant publication. 
 
1.3 DATA AND MEASURES 
1.3.1 Data 
The patent data comes from EPO’s Worldwide Patent Statistical Database April 2012 
(“PATSTAT”) that contains patent information from all major patent offices, including 
the USPTO. From January 2, 2001, the USPTO adopted “kind codes” to differentiate 
between granted patents that were kept secret up to grant and patents that were 
published before grant, B1 and B2, respectively.  
As the focus of this study is publicly traded companies and their choice of publishing 
or not the patent application, the sample contains patents  applied for by publicly traded 
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firms. Using Kogan et al. (2016)12 database, I merged USPTO patents to CRSP permnos 
and then merged permnos to gvkeys (Compustat). These merging procedures yield a 
final sample13 of 468,556 granted patents, applied for from November 29, 2000 to 
December 29, 2009 and granted up to November 02, 2010. The sample period is 
bounded by the AIPA enactment and database limitations (footnote 13). The merged 
patents were applied for by 2,645 different companies. In this sample, on average, 
8.15% of the patents were opted-out. Figure 1.1 displays the proportion of opted-out 
patents along the analyzed period. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1.1 - Percentage of patent applications published and not published before grant– Granted 
patents up to 2010. 
 
 
1.3.2 Dependent variable 
To understand the drivers of opting out of pre-grant patent publication, patents were 
identified as published and not published before grant by the USPTO kind codes. The 
12 Kogan et al. (2016) provide a match for all USPTO granted patents up to 2010 and CRSP permnos. 
13 When merging with Compustat data I also dropped patents that had corresponding negative sales 
values. 
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dependent variable is equal to one if the patent’s kind code is B1 (not published) and 
zero if it is B2 (published).  
 
1.3.2 Independent variables 
Technological crowdedness 
To test hypothesis 1 I follow Hedge et al. (2007) and measured technological 
crowdedness by counting the number of different assignees of the patents listed as 
reference (backward citations) and that are not the same as the assignee(s) of the focal 
patent. It indicates that the inventor is operating in a crowded technological area with a 
number of “nearby” patents and competitors (Hall et al., 2009). Cockburn and 
MacGarvie (2006) use the number of cited assignees to proxy for the number of 
potential licensors. Accordingly, as this number increases, the costs for a potential 
entrant increase.  
Internal knowledge (Self-citation Ratio) 
To test hypothesis 2, I use the ratio of self-citations to the backward citations to 
proxy for the degree to which each patent builds on in-house knowledge. Self-cited 
patents are patents assigned to the same assignee of the focal patent. Graham (2004) 
uses the backward self-citation ratio as a measure of the technology control a firm has 
over the technology trajectory in which the focal patent lies in and finds that the 
backward self-citation ratio combined with secrecy (measured by managers’ response 
when secrecy is considered as an effective appropriability mechanism) is positively 
associated to patent filing strategies (filing continuation applications). 
Radicalness  
I use two variables to proxy for invention radicalness (hypothesis 3). First,  I use the 
radicalness index provided by the OECD REGPAT Database14. Based on the patents 
cited by the focal patent, this index measures the number of different four-digits IPC 
(International Patent Classification) classes into which  the focal patent is classified and 
to which the cited patents are not classified. It follows Shane (2001)’s definition but the 
OECD indicator (Squicciarini et al., 2013) is normalized by the total number of classes 
listed in the backward citations, considering the most disaggregated level available. 
Thus, the higher the index the more the focal patent builds on distinct knowledge and, 
therefore, represents a radical innovation. However, the radicalness index represents 
14 OECD, REGPAT database, February 2015 
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how radical is an invention to the firm, it does not imply that this technological novelty 
is on the invention level (Verhoeven et al., 2016). 
Additionally, as a proxy for novelty in the invention level, I use the dispersion index 
proposed by Melero and Palomeras (2015) and create a variable NEW 
COMBINATIONS. This variable is a binary variable equal one when there was no 
previus IPC classes combination to calculate the index. The dispersion index measures 
the variance of the importance of past innovations in a given technological domain by 
the number of citations received (forward citations). The index is defined as follows 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) = 𝜎𝜎2
𝜇𝜇
 
where 𝜎𝜎2 represents the variance and 𝜇𝜇 the mean of the standardized forward citations 
(Hall et al. 2001) received by previous patents assigned to the same combination of IPC 
8-digits, the most disaggregated level. Following Melero and Palomeras, I assigned the 
index calculated using patents applied for during the previous five years before the focal 
patent was applied for.  
 
1.3.4 Control variables 
First, I control for patent characteristics – number of claims, patent scope (number of 
unique four-digit IPC subclasses) (Lerner, 1994), number of assignees, whether the 
patent is not part of a patent family, whether the assignee is from the US, and indicator 
variables for discrete and complex technologies15.  
Patent characteristics were found to be positively correlated with patent value 
(Harhoff et al., 1999, 2003a; Lanjow and Shankerman, 1999) and more valuable patents 
are internationally protected (Putnam, 1996). Hence, valuable patents might be 
published before grant as it also allows foreign patent protection. Controlling for patent 
characteristics, variables that might affect the likelihood of an application to be 
published before grant are held constant. Additionally, the model includes a dummy 
variable identifying patents that were not applied for outside the US and do not have 
any related international patent, i.e., singleton patents16,17. 
15 Von Graevenitz et al. (2011). 
16 Singletons patents are defined as “single patent applications that form patent families on their own 
because they are not related to any other application” (Martinez, p. 2, 2011) 
17 PATSTAT record data for DOCDB patent family and INPADOC patent family. DOCDB patent 
families referred to a set of patents that protect the same technical content, defined by European Patent 
Office’s (EPO) examiners. Differently, INPADOC patent families, also called INPADOC extended 
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The claims define the invention to which protection is sought. The claims are the 
legally protected part of the patent document, over what the patentee can be sued or sue 
a possible infringer. Therefore, the number and content of claims can be seen as a 
measure of the breadth of a patent. With respect to patent scope, a patent allocated to 
more subclasses means that it has a greater technological potential and a greater market 
value (Lerner, 1994).  
To identify the technological field of a patent I use the OECD classification, which is 
based on Schmoch (2008), and provides an IPC-technology concordance by main 
technology field.18 First I identified four main technology groups, semiconductors, 
computers, biotechnology, and pharmaceutics. Also, I included a dummy variable when 
the patent is classified in more than one technology field, what may broaden the use of 
the given invenvion. Further,  I classified patents by discrete or complex19 technologies 
following Von Graevenitz et al. (2011). This classification does not include all 
technology fields; it means that there are some patents that are neither discrete nor 
complex. 
Furthermore, I use some indicators based on patent characteristics, basic research and 
originality. Basic research is the ratio of non-patent literature (NPL) to backward 
citations, reflecting how much the patented invention relies on scientific knowledge. 
The originality index, first proposed by Trajtenberg et al. (1997), “refers to the breadth 
of technology fields on which a patent relies” (Squicciarini et al., p. 49, 2013). It is 
based on the different classes to which backward citations are allocated. Besides 
building on Hall et al. (2001), the OECD’s originality index uses IPC 8-digits 
classification. The originality index reflects patents building on a wide array of 
technology classes. 
On the firm level, I control for some firm characteristics. Firm size is proxied by the 
natural logarithm of sales. Firm size may also capture firms’ financial constraints as 
smaller firms have bigger restrictions to access financial markets. I use the pre-tax 
foreign income (PIFO20 in Compustat) and assign the value 1 if PIFO is greater than 
zero or 0 otherwise as a proxy for firms’ foreign activities21. Having foreign operations 
priority patent families, referred to a broader set of patents direct or indirectly linked by patent application 
priorities. In our main analysis, I used the DOCDB patent family definition. 
18 I use the technological field classification included in the OECD, REGPAT database, February 2016. 
19 According to Cohen et al. (2000), discrete technologies refer to products that are protected by few 
patents, whereas, complex technologies require many patents to protect a single product. 
20 Missing values were replaced by zero (Hanlon et al., 2015) 
21 As a robustness check I also include the continuous variable and results were similar. 
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makes foreign patenting more relevant and, therefore, can be related to the decision to 
have the patent application published 18 months after filing and protected in multiple 
countries. In addition, I control for the industry’s competition intensity by the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI)22. I also control for the total number of patents 
applied for by the company in the respective year.  
 
1.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 1.1 presents descriptive statistics and table 1.2 presents the correlation matrix.  
As already noted in the literature, patent characteristics – claims, patent scope, 
backward citations, have a very skewed distribution (Scherer and Harhoff, 2000; 
Harhoff et al., 2003a). In our sample, it can be seen from table 1.1 that, on average, 
patents that were opted out of pre-grant publication were secret for about 20 months 
more than patents that were published before grant23. 
In order to test the hypotheses I estimate a linear probability model (LPM) where the 
dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 0 if the patent application was published 
before grant and equal 1 if the patent application was not published before grant 24. A 
LPM provides a simple and good approximation to the average partial effects 
(Wooldgridge, p. 563, 2010), moreover, the objective of this study is not to make 
forecasts but to identify the effect of the explanatory variables on the decision to publish 
or not a patent application. Table1. 3 reports the results, model 1 refers to the baseline 
model and model 2 presents the results including the control variables. The independent 
variables, crowdedness, internal knowledge (self-citation ratio), and radicalness are in 
logarithm. All estimations include company fixed effects, application year fixed effects 
and the standard errors are clustered by company. 
Results show that hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected, as patents belonging to a crowded 
technological area are more likely to be published before grant. However, the size of the 
coefficient suggests that the effect of preemption is only marginally important in driving 
the choice of having the patent application published before grant. Regarding 
hypothesis 2, estimated results show that the more a patent builds on in-house 
knowledge stock the more likely it is to be kept secret up to grant. However, results 
22 Calculated using Compustat by three-digit SIC codes. 
23 Grant lag (not-published) = 979 days (mean), 819 days (median); publication lag (published) = 365 
days (mean), 281 days (median). 
24 I estimate all models using a random sample of 10% of the full sample, accounting for the proportions 
of the dependent variable, singleton patents, and technology fields, applying a logit specification, Results 
are robust and consistent with the ones presented here. Results available on request. 
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show a weakly support for hypothesis 2 as when adding the controls internal knowledge 
is not statistically significant anymore.  
 
TABLE 1.1 – Descriptive statistics 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min Mdn max 
DV 468,556 0.0815 0.274 0 0 1 
TOTAL 468,556 1,056 1,156 1 553 4,308 
HHI 468,556 0.267 0.214 0.0427 0.226 1 
SIZE 462,377 3.942 1.552 0 4.217 7.650 
PATSCOPE 468,556 1.968 1.247 1 2 28 
CLAIMS 468,550 18.48 13.17 1 17 418 
ORIGINALITY 468,514 0.746 0.191 0 0.803 0.990 
RADICALNESS 468,554 0.364 0.269 0 0.322 1 
CROWDEDNESS 468,556 16.96 22.63 0 9 538 
SINGLETON 468,556 0.462 0.499 0 0 1 
INTERNAL 
KNOWLEDGE 468,554 0.0563 0.128 0 0 3 
BASICR 468,554 0.284 1.847 0 0 144 
NEW COMBINATION 468,556 0.000 0.03 0 0 1 
DOM 468,556 0.610 0.488 0 1 1 
NUMASSIGNEES 468,556 1.031 0.209 1 1 14 
FOREIGN (PIFO) 468,556 0.310 0.462 0 0 1 
COMPLEX 468,556 0.819 0.385 0 0 1 
DISCRETE 468,556 0.147 0.355 0 0 1 
RADICALNESS 
(DISCRETE) 468,554 0.0548 0.166 0 0 1 
NEW COMBINATION 
(DISCRETE) 468,556 0.000 0.01 0 0 1 
CROWD (DISCRETE) 468,556 2.678 11.69 0 0 538 
INTERNAL 
KNOWLEDGE 
(DISCRETE) 468,554 0.00897 0.0586 0 0 3 
RADICALNESS 
(COMPLEX) 468,554 0.293 0.279 0 0.209 1 
NEW COMBINATION 
(COMPLEX) 468,556 0.000 0.02 0 0 1 
CROW (COMPLEX) 468,556 13.47 20.72 0 2.079 461 
INTERNAL 
KNOWLEDGE 
(COMPLEX) 468,554 0.0461 0.117 0 0 2 
GRANT_LAGa 430,356 1131.22 497.12 130 1054 3596 
GRANT_LAGb 38,200 978.62 588.35 97 819 3534 
PUB_LAGa 404,339 364.65 212.51 2 281 2157 
a Published patents (B2). Number of days. 
b Not-published patents (B1). Number of days. 
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TABLE 1.2 – Correlation Matrix 
  VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) 
(1) DV 1                          
(2) CROWD (COMPLEX) -0.02 1                         
(3) NC (COMPLEX)a 0.03 0 1                        
(4) RADICALNESS (COMPLEX) 0.09 0.21 0.02 1                       
(5) IK (COMPLEX)b 0 -0.05 0 0.02 1                      
(6) IK (DISCRETE)b -0.01 -0.1 0 -0.16 -0.06 1                     
(7) CROWD (DISCRETE) -0.04 -0.15 0 -0.24 -0.09 0.1 1                    
(8) NC (DISCRETE)a 0.01 -0.01 0 -0.01 0 0.01 0.01 1                   
(9) RADICALNESS (DISCRETE) -0.04 -0.21 -0.01 -0.35 -0.13 0.24 0.5 0.03 1                  
(10) COMPLEX 0.05 0.31 0.01 0.49 0.19 -0.33 -0.49 -0.02 -0.7 1                 
(11) DISCRETE -0.06 -0.27 -0.01 -0.44 -0.16 0.37 0.55 0.03 0.79 -0.88 1                
(12) RADICALNESS 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.76 -0.08 -0.03 0.05 0.01 0.24 -0.05 0.01 1               
(13) NEW COMBINATION 0.03 -0.01 0.8 0.01 0 0 0 0.43 0.01 -0.01 0 0.02 1              
(14) CROWD -0.04 0.82 0 0.03 -0.1 -0.05 0.37 0 0.05 -0.05 0.02 0.08 0 1             
(15) INTERNAL KNOWLEDGE -0.01 -0.09 0 -0.06 0.88 0.4 -0.04 0 -0.01 0 0.01 -0.09 0 -0.12 1            
(16) FOREIGN (PIFO) 0.01 -0.04 0 -0.03 0.01 0.03 0 0 0 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 0 -0.04 0.02 1           
(17) NUMASSIGNEES -0.03 0.08 0 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.08 0 0.02 -0.03 0.04 -0.02 0 0.11 -0.03 0.03 1          
(18) DOM 0.17 0.17 0.01 0.06 -0.07 -0.02 0.11 0.01 0.07 -0.08 0.06 0.12 0.01 0.24 -0.07 -0.22 -0.08 1         
(19) SINGLETON 0.22 0.09 0.01 0.06 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0 0 0 0 0.07 0.01 0.1 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.38 1        
(20) BASICR 0 -0.04 0 -0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0 0.08 -0.11 0.13 -0.01 0 -0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.05 1       
(21) ORIG -0.05 0.14 0 0.32 -0.09 -0.01 0.13 0 0.18 -0.13 0.13 0.46 0 0.2 -0.09 0 0 0.08 0.01 0 1      
(22) CLAIMS 0.07 0.14 0 0.04 -0.03 -0.02 0.06 0 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.04 0 0.17 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.21 0.09 0 0.06 1     
(23) PATSCOPE -0.14 -0.01 -0.01 -0.14 -0.06 0.05 0.15 -0.01 0.11 -0.2 0.22 -0.09 -0.02 0.07 -0.03 0.05 0.04 -0.08 -0.1 0.1 0.29 -0.01 1    
(24) SIZE -0.17 -0.12 -0.01 0.01 0.1 -0.01 -0.11 0 -0.08 0.13 -0.11 -0.05 -0.01 -0.19 0.08 -0.17 0.06 -0.31 -0.19 -0.08 -0.05 -0.18 -0.02 1   
(25) HHI -0.07 -0.05 0 0 0.05 0.02 -0.04 0 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 0 0 -0.05 0.06 0.01 0.06 -0.19 -0.13 -0.06 0 -0.09 0.04 0.34 1  
(26) TOTAL -0.15 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 0.14 -0.03 -0.14 -0.01 -0.14 0.21 -0.18 -0.12 -0.01 -0.15 0.11 -0.05 0.06 -0.28 -0.07 -0.05 -0.07 -0.13 -0.03 0.63 0.27 1 
*Dependent variable (DV): 0 if patent published; 1 if patent not published.  Note: All correlations are significant at 5% except the ones in bold.   Obs.:498,556. 
aNC= NEW COMBINATION 
bIK= INTERNAL KNOWLEDGE
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I test hypothesis 3a and 3b by using two variables, radicalness and the new 
combination dummy. This variable accounts for first time IPC 8-digits combinations, 
therefore, this patents bear the highest uncertainty. Considering both variables, 
hypothesis 3a cannot be rejected meaning that the more radical is the invention the 
more likely is the patent to be opted out of pre-grant publication.  
In addition, I test differences among the two broad types of technologies, complex 
and discrete, reported in table 1.6. Model 1 shows results for the complex technology 
patents compared to others technologies, not classified in any of the two main 
categories. Model 3 displays results for discrete patents compared to other 
technologies. Results show that the effect of the independent variables on the 
likelihood of opting out of pre-grant patent application publication do not 
qualitatively differ between technology categories. The differences between the 
technology categories appear on the size of the coefficients. However, the effect of all 
variables have the same direction and are statisticaly significant. 
 
TABLE 1.3 – Drivers of opting-out. Dependent variable: Published (0) or not-
published (1)  
 
 
(1) (2) 
VARIABLES LPM LPM 
  
  CROWDEDNESS -0.019*** -0.018*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
RADICALNESS 0.054*** 0.061*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) 
NEW COMBINATIONS 0.220*** 0.194*** 
 
(0.029) (0.028) 
INTERNAL KNOWLEDGE 0.038* 0.027 
 
(0.018) (0.018) 
Controls 
 
Included 
Company FE Included Included 
Application Year FE Included Included 
Constant 0.068*** 0.030 
 
(0.013) (0.040) 
   Observations 468,554 462,334 
R-squared 0.329 0.343 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are cluster by company in all models. *** 
p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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1.5 ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS AND ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
In this section, I present some additional analysis to further investigate the 
robustness of the results. In order to do that, I add an interaction term between internal 
knowledge and the industry competition, estimate the models using different samples, 
and investigate the motives to opt-out of earlier patent application publication by 
technology categories. 
 
TABLE 1.4 – Drivers of opting-out. Dependent variable: Published (0) or not-
published (1). Interaction 
 
(1) (2) 
VARIABLES LPM LPM 
   CROWDEDNESS -0.017*** -0.019*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
RADICALNESS 0.061*** 0.054*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) 
NEW COMBINATIONS 0.194*** 0.220*** 
 
(0.028) (0.029) 
HHI† X INTERNAL KNOWLEDGE 0.042a 0.053* 
 
(0.023) (0.023) 
CONTROLS Included 
 
COMPANY FE Included Included 
APPLICATION YEAR FE Included Included 
Constant 0.030 0.067*** 
 
(0.040) (0.012) 
   Observations 462,334 468,554 
R-squared 0.343 0.329 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are cluster by company in all models. *** 
p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, a p<0.1. 
†HHI=1-HHI 
 
First, I estimate the previous models adding an interaction between the degree of 
competition (HHI) and the self-citation ratio (Table 1.4). This interaction is included 
to test the hypothesis that when an invention relies more one internal knowledge firms 
face the threat of losing competitive advantage. Thus, more competition would 
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increase the likelihood of a patent application to be secret up to grant. The coefficient 
of the interaction term is positive and significant, even when adding the control 
variables. It suggests that the effect of building on internal knowledge on the 
likelihood of a patent being opted-out is more pronounced when the inventive firm is 
operating in a more competitive environment.  
TABLE 1.5 – Drivers of opting-out. Singletons. Dependent variable: Published (0) or 
not-published (1) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES LPM LPM LPM LPM 
  
  
  
CROWDEDNESS -0.024*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.024*** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
RADICALNESS 0.079*** 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.079*** 
 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
NEW COMBINATIONS 0.214*** 0.193*** 0.193*** 0.214*** 
 
(0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) 
INTERNAL KNOWLEDGE 0.010 0.007   
 
(0.021) (0.020)   
HHI† X INTERNAL KNOWLEDGE   0.014 0.017 
   (0.024) (0.024) 
Controls 
 
Included Included  
Company FE Included Included Included Included 
Application Year FE Included Included Included Included 
Constant 0.076*** 0.056 0.056 0.076*** 
 
(0.014) (0.070) (0.070) (0.014) 
   
  
Observations 216,289 213,008 213,008 216,289 
R-squared 0.417 0.427 0.427 0.417 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are cluster by company in all models. *** 
p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, a p<0.1. 
†HHI=1-HHI 
 
 
Additionaly, as opting out of earlier publication requires the inventor to forgo 
foreign publication, I restrict the sample to singleton patents, i.e., patents that do not 
belong to a patent family, only applied for in the US. Although one can think that the 
main reason to publish the patent application is to seek foreign protection, when 
considering only patents applied in the US 84.5% of the patents were published 
before grant. Therefore, by restricting the sample to patents only filed in the US I am 
comparing patents that could have been secret,  but were published instead, to pre-
grant secret patents.  
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On average, patents that were not published before grant took less time to issue25 
and, therefore, pre-grant published patents may be underrepresented in my sample, as 
it includes patents granted up to 2010. In order to reduce this possible bias, all the 
regressions were re-estimated considering patents applied for between 2000 and 
200726. Results are consistent with the results presented above.  
 
TABLE 1.6 – Drivers of opting-out. Dependent variable: Published (0) or not-
published (1).  Full sample and singleton subsample. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES FULL SINGLE FULL SINGLE 
      
CROWD (COMPLEX) -0.018*** -0.025***   
 
(0.002) (0.003) 
  
NEW COMBINATION (COMPLEX) 0.250*** 0.221***   
 
(0.036) (0.038) 
  
RADICALNESS (COMPLEX) 0.067*** 0.093***   
 
(0.010) (0.013) 
  
INTERNAL KNOWLDGE (COMPLEX) 0.036+ 0.007   
 
(0.019) (0.022) 
  
CROWD (DISCRETE)   
-0.009*** -0.010*** 
 
  
(0.001) (0.002) 
NEW COMBINATION (DISCRETE)   
0.283*** 0.288*** 
 
  
(0.053) (0.075) 
RADICALNESS (DISCRETE)   
0.029* 0.030 
 
  
(0.012) (0.020) 
INTERNAL KNOWLDGE (DISCRETE)   
0.090** 0.070+ 
 
  
       (0.030)      (0.039) 
COMPANY FE Included Included Included Included 
APPLICATION YEAR FE Included Included Included Included 
CONSTANT 0.055** 0.134*** 0.071*** 0.095*** 
 
(0.018) (0.022) (0.012) (0.019) 
 
    
OBSERVATIONS 399,454 184,099 84,833 39,482 
R-SQUARED 0.346 0.431 0.200 0.280 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are cluster by company in all models. *** 
p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, a p<0.1. 
 
I also test hypothesis 1 using two alternative measures of technological 
crowdedness. Calculating crowdedness index considering backward citations within a 
time lag difference of 10 and 20 years from the focal patent, respectively. One could 
25 In our sample, the grant lag of not published patents is 2.68 years (1.36 years standard deviation) 
whereas for published patents is 3.1 years (1.61 years standard deviation). 
26 Results available upon request. 
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expect that the effect  of crowdedness is stronger if we consider the more recent cited 
patents. However, results do not show a substantial difference, they remain 
qualitatively and statistically similar27.   
Overall, the estimated results are qualitatively similar to the results for the full 
sample (table 1.5). However, the variable internal knowledge and the interaction term 
between HHI and internal knowledge,  accounting for the use of internal knowledge 
in the patented invention becomes insignificant. This result suggests that, when there 
is no international competition for a given invention, internal knowledge is not a 
motive to opt-out of earlier patent application publication. 
 
TABLE 1.7 – Drivers of opting-out. Dependent variable: Published (0) or not-
published (1).  Full Sample 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES LPM LPM LPM LPM 
  
    CROWDEDNESS -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.018*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
RADICALNESS 0.055*** 0.061*** 0.055*** 0.061*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
NEW COMBINATIONS 0.220*** 0.194*** 0.220*** 0.194*** 
 
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) 
INTERNAL KNOWLEDGE 0.038* 0.027 0.038* 0.027 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
DISCRETE -0.008* -0.001 
  
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
  COMPLEX 
  
0.008** 0.003 
   
(0.003) (0.003) 
CONTROLS 
 
Included 
 
Included 
COMPANY FE Included Included Included Included 
APPLICATION YEAR FE Included Included Included Included 
CONSTANT 0.072*** 0.031 0.064*** 0.029 
 
(0.013) (0.039) (0.012) (0.040) 
     OBSERVATIONS 468,554 462,334 468,554 462,334 
R-SQUARED 0.329 0.343 0.329 0.343 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are cluster by company in all models. *** 
p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, a p<0.1. 
 
 
As the effectiveness of patent protection differ by the characteristics of the 
technology that is protected, motives to opt-out might differ by technology categories. 
27 Results available upon request. 
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Results regarding technology moderation in the singleton subsample, complex or 
discrete, are displayed in table 1.6, model 2 and 4. Estimations resembled the ones 
described in the previous section for the full sample. In the case of the singleton 
patents subsample, however, two variables differ when considering the type of 
technology, while the other results are qualitatively and statistically similar. First, 
internal knowledge does not have a significant effect on the probability of keeping the 
patent secret before grant when the technology is complex. Second, when the 
technology is discrete, radicalness is not significant anymore. 
 
TABLE 1.8 – Drivers of opting-out. Dependent variable: Published (0) or not-
published (1). Singleton subsample. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES LPM LPM LPM LPM 
     CROWDEDNESS -0.024*** -0.019*** -0.024*** -0.019*** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
RADICALNESS 0.080*** 0.092*** 0.080*** 0.092*** 
 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
NEW COMBINATIONS 0.213*** 0.193*** 0.214*** 0.194*** 
 
(0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) 
INTERNAL KNOWLEDGE 0.011 0.007 0.010 0.007 
 
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) 
DISCRETE -0.020*** -0.007 
  
 
(0.006) (0.005) 
  COMPLEX 
  
0.015** 0.006 
   
(0.005) (0.005) 
CONTROLS 
 
Included 
 
Included 
COMPANY FE Included Included Included Included 
APPLICATION YEAR FE Included Included Included Included 
CONSTANT 0.096*** 0.062 0.076*** 0.056 
 
(0.016) (0.070) (0.014) (0.070) 
     OBSERVATIONS 216,289 213,008 216,289 213,008 
R-SQUARED 0.417 0.427 0.417 0.427 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are cluster by company in all models. *** 
p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, a p<0.1. 
 
 
Further, to understand the role of technology characteristics on the decision to opt 
out of earlier patent publication I estimate baseline and extended models (full sample 
and singleton patents subsample) including indicator variables for complex and 
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discrete technologies (one at a time). Table 1.7 and 1.8 display the results. When 
considering the differences in the technology protected by a patent, discrete 
technologies are more likely to be published before grant whereas complex 
technologies are more likely to be kept secret until grant. Nevertheless, adding the 
control variables the technology effects become statistically insignificant. 
 
1.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter investigates three hypotheses on publicly traded companies’ choice of 
delaying patent application publication – the effect of the competition faced by the 
invention or the effect of technological crowdedness, the effect of reliance on internal 
knowledge, and the effect of an important invention characteristic, radicalness.  
Theoretical models illustrate the case where a leader and a laggard competing in a 
patent race may publish interim R&D results in order to raise the patentability bar by 
disclosing prior art and, therefore, preventing the rival firm from patenting  (Baker 
and Mezzetti, 2005; Bar, 2006). However, these models usually focus on regular 
publication, e.g. scientific papers and company reports, as means of defensive 
publication. By analyzing firm’s choice of publishing or not the patent application 
before grant I find, support for hypothesis 1 which states that if an invention belongs 
to a technological area where there are many others operating, i.e., in a crowded 
technological space, the patent is more likely to be published before grant. This result 
is aligned with Henkel and Pangerl (2008) and Jell (2011) where they show that the 
patent system is used for defensive publishing. 
While publishing interim R&D results may prevent rivals from patenting, firms 
may strategically hide their internal knowledge, securing competitive advantage.  
Estimations for the baseline model (without the controls) support hypothesis 2, 
suggesting that firms are more likely to opt for pre-grant secrecy the more they rely 
on internal knowledge. However, estimates for the singleton subsample indicates that 
patents only filed nationally (in the US), published or not before grant, do not differ 
regarding the use of firms’ own previous patents. Delaying the disclosure of a patent 
that builds on a firm’s internal knowledge might help the firm to hide its technology 
direction, preserving strategic knowledge embodied in the patent. Moreover, by 
publishing the patent application before grant, inventors face the risk of revealing how 
to further use internal knowledge without being awarded the exclusivity right.  
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Patent preemption and internal knowledge strategies relate to the company 
strategies. Nevertheless, keeping the application secret up to grant also relates to the 
invention characteristics. For that reason, in addition to including patent 
characteristics, I investigate how being radical, as in Shane (2001), affects the firm’s 
opting out decision. In addition, I include a variable which captures new combinations 
of IPC classes. In line with hypothesis 3a, I find that the more a patented invention 
differs from previous firms’ inventions, the more radical it is, and being a new 
combination in the technological space, the more likely it is for the patent to be opted 
out of pre-grant application publication. Indeed, the variable accounting for new 
technologies combination, which means high technology uncertainty, turns out to 
have the biggest coefficient in all estimation models. Kim at al. (2016) state that firms 
may derive higher value by delaying patenting in a context of high uncertainty.  
Johnson (2014) predicts that inventors are more likely to publish defensively their 
inventions for the less technically challenging inventions. Additionally, Ceccagnoli 
(p. 4, 2008) pointed out that “the more drastic the underlying innovation on which the 
R&D competition is based the lower the incentives for and the profits with 
preemptive patenting”. 
Regarding the technology domain of the invention, inventors report being more 
able to appropriate returns from the innovation in discrete technologies (Cohen et al., 
2000), what in general makes patents from discrete technologies more likely to opt for 
pre-grant publication28. Furthermore, empirical evidence has shown that the 
propensity to patent and the value of patents differ by the nature of the technology, 
complex or discrete technologies (Mansfield, 1986). While patents more effectively 
protect discrete technologies, complex industries patent intensively in order to have a 
higher stake in cross-licensing deals (Cohen et al., 2000; Levin et al., 1987). Png 
(2015), analyzing the impact of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) implemented 
in the US, shows that complex industries patented significantly less as trade secret 
became stronger. Therefore, complex products may be more likely to opt for pre-grant 
secrecy taking advantage of the extra secrecy time earned by delaying disclosure. 
Based on the stated results, this study makes two main contributions to the 
literature. First, it is the first study to evaluate public companies’ motives to opt out of 
earlier patent application publication, using a large sample of patents. Although, the 
28 In this sample, 4.35% of the discrete patents were opted out of pre-grant patent application 
publication, while 8.83% of the complex patents were kept secret until grant. 
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publication of the majority of the patents occur before the patent is granted, still about 
8.15% of publicly traded companies’ patent applications are kept secret up to grant. 
Hence, this study contributes to increase our understanding of firms’ filing strategies 
to capture value from their inventions and on how firms use the patent system.  
Second, this study unveils empirical evidence on preemptive and strategic behavior. 
On the one hand, pre-grant publication might be associated with preemption motives, 
as a crowded technological space increases the likelihood of earlier patent application 
publication. On the other hand, pre-grant secrecy might be associated with a firm 
hiding strategically its internal knowledge, specially in more competitive industries. 
Moreover, companies strategically have used patent pre-grant secrecy to guarantee 
exclusivity over radical and uncertain inventions by postponing invention disclosure. 
Finally, our findings suggest some policy implications. First, AIPA’s earlier 
publication rule has two main goals: to harmonize the US patent rules with the rest of 
the world (Allison et al., 2003) and to foster knowledge diffusion (Johnson and Popp, 
2001). It has been shown that earlier publication fosters diffusion of R&D knowledge, 
preventing R&D duplication (Aoki and Spiegel, 2009; Baruffaldi and Simeth, 2015). 
Empirical findings show that inventions that are more radical are more likely to be 
secret up to grant; therefore, in the absence of this option radical inventions would be 
made available earlier. Second, pre-grant patent application secrecy is associated with 
internal knowledge protection, thus it might delay the development of new 
technologies and may hamper competition in a given technology domain. 
Consequently, revoking this option could accelerate the development of new 
technologies and boost competition. 
Last but not least, we have to acknowledge that this analysis presents some 
limitations. First and more important, results are based on the analysis of only granted 
patents. This is because, by construction, it is not possible to observe opted out patent 
applications if they were not granted (the publication of a non-granted application is 
precisely one of the risks firms try to avoid when taking the opting-out decision). 
Note, less than 72% (Carley et al., 2015) of applications result in granted patents. 
Despite there is not much known regarding how the granted and not-granted 
applications (and their underlying innovations) differ, we can expect that there are 
differences between both groups. Results have thus to be interpreted carefully. Results 
would hold for the sample of applications if patent characteristics affecting the 
probability to get granted are the same across the two groups. Unfortunately, this 
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evidence is not so far available. Moreover, controlling for many patent characteristics 
that might influence the probability of a patent being grant, results still hold. Second, 
the trade-off imposed by AIPA might be stronger to higher internationalized firms. 
Therefore, it might be important to control for other variables, in addition to PIFO, to 
capture firms’ international operations – e.g., the number of foreign subsidiaries. 
Third, it might be that market uncertainty has a more important role in driving pre-
grant secrecy decision, what would imply it to be explicitly controlled for. Finally, in 
analyzing publicly traded companies this result must be seen with cautions and might 
not be generalized to private, small firms. 
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Chapter 2 
Patent value in financial markets: An event 
study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Researchers have agreed that patents convey valuable information. Previous 
literature has shown that patent counts and patent quality, as measured by citations 
received by firm’s patents (forward citations), are positively correlated with firm 
value – e.g., Tobin’s q, future earnings (Griliches, 1981; Cockburn and Griliches, 
1988; Hirschey et al., 2001; Hall et al, 2005; Gu, 2005). In addition to an aggregate 
measure of innovation, individual patents provide information about a particular 
innovation and a technology’s future prospects as well as information that can reveal 
its value for the firm.  
Assessing the value of a patent is relevant for several reasons: it provides 
information to policymakers about how the patent system rewards inventors; it helps 
account for the value of intangible assets and helps estimate more accurately firm 
value (Bessen, 2008); and finally, it aids in the measurement of R&D productivity and 
quality at the firm and economy level.  
Previous research has looked at different types of patent value – private value and  
social value (Hirshleifer, 1971; Harhoff et al., 1999). Private value refers to the 
returns that a firm derives from a patent either by using it in its products, selling it on 
the market, or using it strategically to deter competitors from encroaching on its 
product space. The social value emanates from the disclosure of information and the 
knowledge spillovers that the patent generates for other firms.  
Previous research has correlated various patent characteristics such as forward 
citations (Harhoff et al., 1999, 2003a; Trajtenberg, 1990; Lanjow and Shankerman, 
1999; Hall et al., 2000, 2005), backward citations (Reitzig, 2004), and number of 
claims (Tong and Frame, 1994) to measures of patent value. Patent value has also 
been estimated through patent renewal rates (Lanjow et al., 1996; Pakes, 1984; 
Schankerman and Pakes, 1985; Bessen, 2008), litigations and relevant awards 
(Lanjow and Schankerman, 1997; Allison et al., 2003), and patent family size (the 
number of countries in which the patent is taken out) (Putnam, 1996). 
The patent system exists to promote knowledge creation and innovation, and 
therefore, to circumvent the resource misallocation problem in knowledge production 
by transforming a public good29 into a private good (Arrow, 1962).  It does that 
29 According to Arrow (1962), knowledge has characteristics of public good: non-rivalrous and non-
excludable. Non-rivalrous means that the use of a particular innovation by a producer does not preclude 
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through two mechanisms – 1) by letting those who create knowledge appropriate the 
returns to their creation and thus invest in knowledge production and 2) by diffusing 
knowledge to those who can further build on the knowledge created.  The first is 
achieved through granting exclusivity right to the inventor for a certain period of time 
and the second through the public disclosure of the invention30. Researchers have 
argued that the disclosure of the invention has two strategic effects – 1) it lets 
competitors imitate and copy the invention after the patent expires and/or invent 
around the invention during the patent term and 2) the knowledge conveyed in the 
patent may signal to the firm investors or the general public the firm’s research 
quality and capabilities (Long, 2002). This second function can in turn help 
generate investments by attracting external financing ( Haussler, Harhoff, & Mu¨ller, 
2012; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2008). It is not unreasonable then, to expect that a patent 
grant will generate positive value for the firm.  
In this study, we use an event study methodology to investigate stock market 
valuation of individual patented inventions by measuring abnormal returns around a 
patent grant. Drawing on the market efficiency hypothesis, the company’s stock price 
immediately incorporates a new, unanticipated, information release – in our study: the 
patent event. Therefore, an abnormal stock price movement on the event date reflects 
the value of the information described in the patent (Kothari and Werner, 2007). 
Stock market reaction to a patent event provides an ex-ante value measure, i.e., before 
the value of the innovation is realized. Thus, it helps managers to make better 
informed decisions regarding innovation investments. 
We use a large sample of USPTO granted patents during 1995-2006 and evaluate 
stock market reaction to patent grants, calculating abnormal returns around the grant 
date. Further, we analyze different samples of patents that are deemed to be more 
valuable, highly cited patents and patents that are related to what eventually became 
successful products – pharmaceutical drugs. We do not find significant abnormal 
returns, on average,  generated due to a patent grant in any of these samples. 
Additionally, we investigate a possible anticipation reaction by estimating 
abnormal returns to events prior to the patent grant: patent application publication and 
its use by others. Knowledge is a non-excludable good because the innovator is not always able to 
prevent others from using it without authorization once it has been disclosed and in the absence of 
patents.  
30 Throughout this chapter, we use invention and innovation interchangeably. 
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patent notice of allowance (NOA). We do not find evidence of anticipation through 
market reaction to patent events before grant, i.e., not significant abnormal returns. 
The complexity and technicality of a patent document might preclude investors 
from assessing the value of the information conveyed by a patent. Moreover, 
innovation related information is hard to process causing investors to not pay 
attention and to underreact (Hirshleifer et al.,2013). In addition, a patent is highly 
uncertain as it usually happens at the beginning of the innovation project. To further 
test if the absence of abnormal returns is because of the inability of investors to value 
innovation we use a sample of US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) drug 
approvals. The approval of a drug means that this innovation is allowed to be 
commercialized, and therefore, is easier to investors to assess its value. In the case of 
FDA approvals, we find, on average,  significant and positive abnormal returns 
around the event day, suggesting that investors react to an innovation related 
information with immediate impact on sales. A closer to market innovation also 
means less uncertainty regarding future cash flows.  
There are few studies evaluating the value of an individual patent applying an 
event study (Austin, 1993; Liu, 2006; Plumlee at al., 2015) . This papers typically 
conduct analysis to restricted samples of particular sectors (i.e., biotechnology or 
other R&D intensive sectors), type of patents (those announced in the press)and type 
of firms (large firms). Our study aims to provide a more comprehensive analysis of 
this phenomena by examining the market reaction of a representative patent event. 
Our sample, thus, includes all patenting firms from all patenting sectors. We 
contribute to the patent valuation literature by analyzing the value, as represented by 
stock market abnormal returns, of several patent-related events and a product-related 
event (FDA approvals). After ruling out several alternative explanations, results 
indicate that the uncertainty and risky nature of innovation hamper investors in their 
ability to assess the value of information disclosed in the patent event. Therefore, 
following stock market reaction to patent events may not lead to optimal innovation 
investment decision, possibly leading to innovation  myopia. Moreover, we study 
stock market reaction to a close-to-the-market innovation (FDA approvals) and 
highlight stock market’s reaction differences.   
 
 
2.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
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A patent is a document that bestows a temporary exclusivity right (20 years from 
the filing date) over an invention, product or process31 that has to comply with 
novelty, nonobviousness, and usefulness criteria32. The patent results in the disclosing 
of technical information about the invention. Therefore, patent data have been used as 
a proxy for innovation even though they are imperfect measures of innovations – not 
all innovations are patented and the propensity to patent varies by industries, 
technologies, and countries (Griliches, 1990). Disclosing the invention through the 
patent works as a signal of the firm’s knowledge and research quality (Anton and 
Yao, 2004).  
Using patents as a measure of innovation, previous research has shown that 
innovation has a positive effect on measures of firm value and performance. Hirschey 
et al. (2001) find that the quality of the R&D output, measured by the citations 
received by the firm’s patents, is positively correlated with the firm’s book value of 
high-tech companies. Also investigating the effect of firm’s patents’ forward citations 
on firm value accounting based measures, Gu (2005) reports a positive association 
between patent citation impact and future realized earnings. However, the author finds 
stock market investors underreact when incorporating patent citation information on 
stock value and earnings forecast. As a result, even though changes in patent citations 
are significantly associated with firm’s future returns, investors seem to partially 
ignore this information.  
Previous studies report a positive relation between Tobin’s q33, as a measure of firm 
value, and different measures of patent quality and quality of firm’s innovation output 
(Hall et al., 2005; Lanjow and Schankerman, 2004). In addition, Hirshleifer et al. 
(2013) find that the stock market recognizes the value of innovative efficiency, i.e., 
the ability of a firm to generate patents and patent citations per dollar invested in 
R&D, and accords higher valuations to firms that are more efficient. Therefore, stock 
price informativeness reduces the information asymmetry of the innovative activity 
thus spurring innovation (Blanco and Wehrheim, 2016). 
31 http://www.wipo.int/patents/en/.  
32 Novelty refers to an invention being new compared to prior art (published inventions and previous 
patents). Moreover, to be patent an invention has to be non-obvious to a person having ordinary skills 
in the art and useful, meaning that it provides some benefits and is capable of use (32 35 U.S.C. § 102 
and 35 U.S.C. § 103). 
33 Tobin’s q measures the ratio of a firm’s value to the replacement cost of its tangible assets 
(Villalonga, 2004). 
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Additionally, researchers have attempted to identify valuable individual patents. 
Determining patent value is a very difficult task as the value of an invention is 
unfolded over time and there are many worthless patents while just a few are highly 
valuable. Despite the limitations of the patent information, researchers have assessed 
patent value by renewal rates (Lanjow et al., 1996; Pakes, 1984; Schankerman and 
Pakes, 1985; Bessen, 2008), litigations (Lanjow and Schankerman, 1997; Allison et 
al., 2003), family size (Putnam, 1996), and forward citations (Harhoff et al., 1999, 
2003a; Trajtenberg, 1990; Lanjow and Shankerman, 1999).  
The rationale for these aforementioned measures is the following. In measuring 
patent value by the renewal rate, it is assumed that the firm (inventor) is going to pay 
renewal fees if the value of the invention is greater than the fee and costs associated 
with the renewal34. Not paying the renewal fee means abandoning the patent. 
Regarding litigations, the authors argue that a patent is going to be subject of a 
litigation suit if it is worth paying the legal costs, and litigated patents are identified as 
the most important patents by competitors (Allison et al., 2003). Family size refers to 
the number of countries where the patent is applied for. As it is costly to apply and to 
maintain a patent, the value of the patented invention increases with the family size. 
Finally, forward citations or the number of citations received by a patent capture not 
only the economic value but also the technological value of the invention. The more 
citations a patent received the more it has been important for future inventions and for 
further developments of a given technology. Other patent characteristics such as 
patent claims (Tong and Frame, 1994), backward citations (Reitzig, 2004), and the 
number of technology classes (Lerner, 1994) were also found to be correlated with 
patent value indicators.  
Valuing patents is important because it gives us information about a different 
variable – the productivity of investments in innovation. Researchers are also 
interested in valuing patents such that they can proxy for the patents’ quality and use 
them to understand economic indicators (e.g., innovation quality, R&D productivity, 
and the productivity of specific inventors or firms). According to Reitzig (2006), the 
value of a patent is determined by the value of its underlying technology, technical, 
legal and market uncertainty, and by the competition perceived by the patent holder.  
34 The USPTO require maintenance fees at 3.5, 7.5 and 11.5 years after the patent issuing date. 
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-maintaining-patent/maintain-your-patent,   
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Using a more direct measure of the value of an individual patent, Austin (1993) 
estimates patent value in the biotechnology industry through an event study. Using a 
sample of 258 solitary-event patents owned by the largest 20 biotechnology firms as 
of November 1991, Austin shows that the patent grant (official USPTO grant day) of 
patents that were subsequently announced in The Wall Street Journal generated 
significantly higher abnormal returns than the not announced patents group.  In 
addition, product-linked patents, identified by the author, also generated higher 
abnormal returns than the patents not linked to products.  
Liu (2006) investigates stock market reaction to 611 innovation announcements 
(FDA approvals, patent grants, scientific breakthrough, alliances or joint ventures, 
and other technological news) in the biotechnology industry, between 1983 and 1993. 
The author documents positive and significant abnormal returns for the innovations 
announcements. With respect to the innovations announcements considered, Liu’s 
study includes 123 patent grant and 157 FDA approvals newswire announcements.  
Considering the USPTO grant day as the event day, Plumlee  et al. (2015) find 
significant and positive two days cumulative abnormal returns from the grant of a 
patent subsequent to a loan initiation. This is, the sample includes patents granted 
applied for firms for which the patent was granted within 6 months after a loan 
initiation, during 1993 to 2003. In this study, the authors do not claim that patents 
generate abnormal returns but that the specific sample of patents used as private 
information in order to get better loan conditions are indeed valuable.  
Another study by Ramanathan et al. (2001) evaluates pharmaceutical patents and 
FDA approvals. In this study the authors conduct an event-study over a sample of 272 
pharmaceutical patent grants, requiring the firm to have a drug previously approved 
by the FDA,  and 537 drugs approved by the FDA, during 1974-1995. The authors 
find no significant abnormal returns due to the patent grant event and significant 
abnormal returns due to FDA approvals.  
Assuming that variations in stock returns reflect shocks to the expected cash flow 
stream (Fama, 1990) a patent event, representing a successful R&D investment, will 
potentially increase a firm’s revenue. As such, this event carries information that 
might be incorporated by the stock market and reflected in stock prices. Therefore, we 
test the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 1:  A patent grant event generates positive and significant 
abnormal returns. 
 
A patent grants the patentee a right to exclude others, i.e., a negative right, which 
means it does not guarantee that the patented invention will be produced and 
commercialized. Conversely, a new product launch or the approval of a new product 
to be commercialized means that all the development costs were already incurred. 
Therefore, if the expected return from the commercialization of a product is positive, 
a new product-related information might be reflected in the abnormal returns of the 
firm stock price.  
In this sense, we argue that an event conveying information of a closer to market 
innovation is going to generate abnormal returns, reflecting investors’ expected 
returns from the innovation. Hence, hypothesis 2 states that: 
 
 Hypothesis 2: An announcement of a close-to-the-market generates positive 
and significant abnormal returns. 
 
2.3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
2.3.1 Event Study 
The event study methodology, formalized by Fama et al. (1969), has a long 
tradition in finance and accounting. More recently, it has been implemented in 
marketing and management studies (Capron and Pistre, 2002; Sood and Tellis, 
2009). 
Standard event study methodology measures a stock’s excess of return, abnormal 
returns (AR), generated due to the arrival of new information by using the residual of 
the return-generating model.  Thus, ARs are the difference between the actual 
return during the event period and the returns that would have been expected if 
the event had not happened (Salinger, 1992). Following McWilliams and Siegel 
(1997)’s steps for an event study, we identified the event date of interest – the patent 
grant date, and defined the event window days surrounding the event date that may 
be affected by the event and may also generate abnormal returns. Then, we 
computed daily abnormal returns, cumulative abnormal returns, and tested the 
statistical significance of abnormal returns generated due to the patent event. 
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Daily abnormal returns are estimated by a two- step procedure. First, normal 
returns during the estimation window are estimated, i.e., the returns that would 
have been observed if the event had not taken place. Normal return-generating 
process is estimated through a window of 60 trading days preceding the event35, 
from day 67 to day 7 prior the event (-67, -7)36. Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) 
argue that a factor model, such as the Fama and French (1993) three-factor 
model, extracts as much as possible of the common residual cross-sectional 
correlation, reducing cross-correlation in abnormal returns to a minimum.  
Therefore, we estimated the Fama and French three- factor model37: 
 (Rit − Rft ) = αi + β1i(Rmt − Rft ) + β2iSMBt + β3iHMLt + εit        (1) 
 
where,  Rit  is the stock return of firm i over the time t, 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  is the rate of return 
attributed to a risk-free investment at time t, usually the interest rate on a three-month 
U.S. Treasury Bill. 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓  accounts for the returns for all firms in NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ at time t, SMBt is the index of small versus big capitalization portfolios at 
time t and HMLt is the index of high versus low book/price ratio portfolios at time t.  
Next, the abnormal returns (ARi) are computed by calculating the difference 
between the actual returns observed over the event window and the expected returns 
given by the above benchmark model. Thus,  
 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓 = 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓 − 𝐸𝐸[𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓 ]                                                               (2) 
 
where 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓  is the abnormal return, 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓  is the observed return and 𝐸𝐸[𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓 ] is the 
expected normal return over the event window t estimated by equation (1). To test the 
null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns we compute the cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARi) aggregating through the event window for each security, assuming no 
confounding effects through the event window.  
According to McWilliams and Siegel (1997) the longer the event window the 
more difficult it is to control for confounding events that may have an effect on 
35 There is no estimation window length standard as a variety of lengths has been used in prior studies 
(Campbell et al., 2003). In this study, we chose a 60 days period in order to retain a larger number of 
observations in our sample since we need to exclude those firms that have a patent event during the 
estimation window. The longer the estimation window, the more patent grants we need to exclude.  
36 Normal returns were also estimated using an event window of 30 days (-7,-37).  
37 In addition, we estimated normal returns using the market model where firm’s returns are a function 
of the market returns, an intercept and, a random error (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997).  
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returns. As it is commonly used in the event study literature, we consider an event 
window of three days, one day before and one day after the event (-1,1)38 (Sears 
and Hoetker, 2014; Alexy and George, 2013; Park and Mezias, 2005). One day 
before the event accounts for anticipation effects, whereas, including the day 
after the event captures announcement effects on price that may arise after stock 
market closing on the event day. 
Hence, CARs are computed aggregating AR over the three days event window 
as follow: 
 
         𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 = ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓=𝑓𝑓2𝑓𝑓=𝑓𝑓1                                                   
(3) 
 
where t1  and t2, respectively denote the beginning and the end of the event 
window.  In additional analyses reported in appendix A.4, we employ a least 
square (OLS) regression where each event’s CARs become the dependent 
variable explained by a set of variables accounting for patent and firm 
characteristics39. 
 
2.3.2 Patent grant data 
The patent data comes from the NBER patent data project40 (Hall et al., 2001), 
which contains USPTO granted patents from 1976 to 2006. Patent data was 
matched with the Center for Research in Security Price (CRSP) unique code 
(permno)41 and patents that did not match were eliminated. To evaluate the patent 
grant event impact on stock market we selected patents applied for from June 8, 
1995, when the patent term extension introduced by the TRIPS agreement was 
enacted in the U.S.42 to the final grant day contained in the NBER database 
(December 26, 2006).  The total number of patents matched to ‘permnos’ is 
567,009 applied for from June 8, 1995 onwards. 
38 We also considered an event window of 5 days (-2,2). 
39 Appendix A.4.3 displays results for extended models estimations. 
40 https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home. Revised as of August 2010. Accessed: June 18, 
2013. 
41 Kogan, L., et al., 2016.  
42 Following the TRIPS agreement patent protection term was extended in U.S. from 17 years after 
grant to 20 years after filing date. http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/uruguay/20 year 
term.html. 
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Patenting intensive firms may have multiple patent events on the same day or 
during the normal return estimation window. To avoid confounding effects by the 
same type of event in estimating normal returns, multiple events in the same day 
by the same firm were eliminated and for each firm we dropped patents that were 
granted within an interval of 70 (40)43 days from each other.  This data screening 
lowered significantly the number of observations in our sample but it gives more 
confidence on the absence of confounding events over the estimation window. In 
addition to patent data screening, observations with missing stock returns during 
the event window and less than 30 days return information during the normal 
returns estimation window were dropped. Additionally, following standard practice 
in the literature we also excluded firms from the financial sector (SICs 6000-
6999) and regulated utilities (SICs 4900-4999) (Hoberg and Phillips, 2010). 
The final sample for the 60 (30) days normal return estimation window includes 
17,193 (26,536) patents filed by 2,946 (2,950) different firms. 
 
2.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Equation 1 presents the model used to estimate normal returns and then we 
compute the abnormal returns as in equation 2. The data used to compute the 
three-factor model proposed by Fama and French (1993) come from CRSP and 
French’s data library44. We winsorize the CAR variable at the 1% level to mitigate 
outlier problems.  Descriptive statistics are displayed in appendix A.2 and A.3. 
 
2.4.1 Patent grant event 
Table 2.1 presents the results regarding the cumulative abnormal returns 
estimated for the patent grant event. Panel A of table 2.1 reports the CARs using the 
full sample of patents. While the first result is statistically significant (p-value<0.05), 
it is equal to zero, and not significant throughout all specifications. Therefore, first 
results indicate that, on average, we cannot accept our hypothesis that a patent grant 
causes the market to react positive and significantly.  
As it is acknowledged by the literature, the value of a patent is very skewed, 
where few patents are valuable (Schankerman and Pakes, 1985; Harhoof et al., 2003). 
43 A normal return estimation window of 100 days (-7, -107) showed consistent results with the ones 
presented here (results available on request). 
44 Available at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.htlm. 
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Moreover, scholars (e.g., Tratjenberg, 1990; Lanjow and Shakerman, 2001) have 
shown that the value of a patent is highly correlated with the number of citations 
received by the patent. The number of citations received is an indicator of the 
importance of a given patent to subsequent inventions, i.e., later patents built upon the 
knowledge describe in the cited patent. Although the number of forward citations is 
an ex-post value indicator, not observed by stock market investors at the moment of 
the patent grant announcement, Hall et al. (2005) argue that the market knows in 
advance about the value of particular innovations.  
We examine if the absence of abnormal returns is due to the fact that the 
distribution is dominated by low quality patents. In order to check whether stock 
market investors assign value to more important patents we estimate the average 
CARs using a subsample of the top 10%  and 1%45 most cited patents46. Panel B in 
table 2.1 presents the results. No CARs generated in the two subsamples of patents 
were statistically significant at the conventional level, suggesting that investors do not 
react significantly to more important patents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2.1 - OLS Estimation. Dependent variable:  Cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR). Patent grant 
 
PANEL A     
Estimation Window = 30 days 
Event window CARs Observations 
(-1,1) 0.000%** 26,536 
(-2,2) 0.000% 26,536 
Estimation Window = 60 days 
Event window CARs Observations 
(-1,1) 0.000% 17,193 
(-2,2) 0.000% 17,193 
   PANEL B 
  Top 10% Forward Citations 
45 Top citations where calculated by technology areas (IPC classes), accounting for citations pattern 
differences. 
46 Appendix A.4.1 describe how we calculate forward citations accounting for censoring bias. 
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Estimation Window = 30 days 
Event window CARs Observations 
(-1,1) 0.00% 2,017 
(-2,2) 0.00% 2,017 
Estimation Window = 60 days 
Event window CARs Observations 
(-1,1) 0.002% 1,182 
(-2,2) 0.002% 1,182 
Top 1% Forward Citations 
Estimation Window = 30 days 
Event window CARs Observations 
(-1,1) -0.002% 107 
(-2,2) 0.005% 107 
Estimation Window = 60 days 
Event window CARs Observations 
(-1,1) 0.004% 53 
(-2,2) 0.017% 53 
All regressions are estimated using robust standard errors clustered by event date. 
Significance:  * p< .1,  ** p<.05 ,  *** p<.01 
 
We further estimate CARs generated due to a patent grant event using a sample 
of patents that eventually became products. We obtain a sample of patents related to 
drugs approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Orange Book47 
where the patents associated with commercialized drugs are listed. This sample is 
expected to signify successful patents. According to Austin (1993), patents identified 
with products tend to be more valuable.  
Considering a normal returns estimation window of 60 (30) days, the sample 
includes 203 (232) patents filed by 55 (55) different firms. Table 2.2 displays the 
CARs for the Orange Book patents. The absence of significant CARs suggests that 
the uncertainty borne by the patented invention prevents investors from assigning a 
value to the future profits that the invention can generate. 
 
 
TABLE 2.2 - OLS Estimation. Dependent Variable:  Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CAR). Orange Book patents 
 
Estimation Window = 30 days 
Event window CARs Observations 
(-1,1) -0.000% 232 
47 The authors received the Orange Book patent data by e-mail from the USPTO. 
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(-2,2) -0.000% 232 
Estimation Window = 60 days 
Event window CARs Observations 
(-1,1) 0.000% 203 
(-2,2) 0.000% 203 
All regressions are estimated using robust standard errors clustered by event date. 
Significance:  * p< .1,  ** p<.05 ,  *** p<.01 
 
 
To further corroborate these findings, we estimate abnormal returns around the 
grant date of patents listed in the Canadian Drug Bank48. We select patent of drugs 
patented for the first time, i.e., the parent patent of drugs approved by the FDA. We 
apply the same methodology described above. In order to retain a greater number of 
observations this sample includes patents granted from July 20, 1987 to February 08, 
2010. Table 2.3 displays the results for 61 patent grants events, applied for by 19 
different companies, for the 60 and 30 days estimation windows. Aligned with the 
previous results, the grants of patents protecting New Molecular Entities (NME) do 
not generate significant abnormal returns.  
 
TABLE 2.3 - OLS Estimation. Dependent Variable:  Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CAR). NME patent grant (Canadian DrugBank) 
Estimation Window = 30 days 
Event window CARs Observations 
(-1,1) 0.005% 61 
(-2,2) 0.004% 61 
Estimation Window = 60 days 
Event window CARs Observations 
(-1,1) 0.005% 61 
(-2,2) 0.007% 61 
All regressions are estimated using robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
2.4.2 Market anticipation hypothesis 
One explanation for the lack of significant abnormal returns may be that the 
value of the patented invention might be already reflected in the stock price; 
therefore, the stock market does not react, on average, to a patent grant event. In fact, 
48 Wishart DS, Knox C, Guo AC, Shrivastava S, Hassanali M, Stothard P, Chang Z, Woolsey J. 
DrugBank: a comprehensive resource for in silico drug discovery and exploration. Nucleic Acids Res. 
2006 Jan 1;34(Database issue):D668-72. 
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the underlying hypothesis of an event study is that abnormal returns are generated 
when the information released was not anticipated (Brown and Warner, 1985). 
Although the grant day of a patent is a surprise (Austin, 1993), the value of the 
invention may be already incorporated in the firm’s stock price as the firm may 
disclose the invention before the patent is granted. Moreover, during the examination 
process, after the enactment of the American Inventors Protection Act49 (AIPA) the 
USPTO publishes the patent application 18 months after the earliest filing date.   
In order to investigate whether the stock market accesses the value of the 
patented invention before the patent is actually granted, we considered two events: 
patent application publication and notice of allowance (NOA)50. Panel A, in table 2.4, 
presents the results regarding patent application publication51, where it shows zero or 
virtually zero average abnormal returns. Zero abnormal returns indicate that investors, 
on average, do not assign a value to the information disclosed in a patent application.  
Panel B displays the results for the NOA52 event53. To estimate NOA abnormal 
returns we use three different event windows: 9 days (-1,7), 10 days (0,9), and 13 (-2, 
10). The NOA is privately sent by the USPTO to the patentee; therefore, the patentee 
has the discretion to disclose the allowance of the patent. It means that the patent 
document per se is not published, instead what is announced is the allowance of the 
patent and what kind of technology it protects. Therefore, we expect the results to be 
nonsignificant as we are considering the USPTO date and patentees usually do not 
disclose having a NOA (Lansford, 2006). On average, we find zero CARs. 
 
TABLE 2.4 - OLS Estimation. Dependent Variable:  Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CAR). Patent Applications Publication (Panel A) and Notice of Allowance  
(Panel B) 
49 The American Inventors Protect Act (AIPA), enacted in November 29, 2000, established automatic 
publication of US patent applications, 18 months after the earliest filing date. However, AIPA gives to 
patentees an option to opt-out of pre-grant publication by certifying that the invention disclosed in the 
application will not be subject of an application in another country or under an international 
multilateral agreement that requires publication 18 months after the filing date (35 U.S. Code § 122). 
50 After examination, if the examiner has decided that the applicant is entitled to a patent under the law, 
a private notification is sent to the applicant by the USPTO – the notice of allowance – informing 
which claims will receive protection and specifying the required fees (37 CFR Section 1.311). 
51 When normal returns estimation window is 60 (30) days, the sample includes 6623 (9830) patents 
filed by 1664 (1668) different firms. 
52Available at: http://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/electronic-data-products/patent-
examination-research-dataset-public-pair 
53 When normal returns estimation window is 60 (30) days, the sample includes 15639 (21332) patents 
filed by 3197 (3089) different firms. 
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 PANEL A     
Estimation Window = 30 days 
Event window CARs Observations 
(-1,1) 0.000%* 9,830 
(-2,2) 0.000% 9,830 
Estimation Window = 60 days 
Event window CARs Observations 
(-1,1) 0.000%*** 6,623 
(-2,2) 0.001%** 6,623 
 
  PANEL B     
Estimation Window = 30 days 
Event window CARs Observations 
(-1,7) -0.002%** 21,332 
(-2,10) -0.002%** 21,332 
(0,9) -0.002% 21,332 
Estimation Window = 60 days 
Event window CARs Observations 
(-1,7) -0.001% 15,639 
(-2,10) -0.003%** 15,639 
(0,9) -0.001% 15,639 
All regressions are estimated using robust standard errors clustered by event date (Panel A) and 
firm(Panel B). 
Significance:  * p< .1,  ** p<.05 ,  *** p<.01 
 
 
With respect to the NOA event, Lansford (2006) finds that a strategic disclosure 
of a NOA dampens negative stock market reactions to negative earnings 
announcement. On the other hand, Lansford stresses that the disclosure of patented 
information means the disclosure of private information that might have a negative 
impact on investors’ reaction. However, the disclosure of non-financial information 
(NOA) has been found to have a positive effect on non-market financial measures 
(Plumlee et al., 2015).  
In summary, patent disclosure events, on average, do not generate significant 
positive abnormal returns; therefore, we cannot accept hypothesis 1. These results 
indicate that not only the stock market does not anticipate the value of a protected 
invention but reinforce the hypothesis of investors not assigning value to patents 
given their  technical knowledge and complex information (Liu, 2006; Gu, 2005).  
Further, appendix A.5 presents the results by pharmaceutical and electronic and 
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computer industries, as patents are not as important in all industries. Results are 
consistent with the ones presented above.  
 
2.4.3  Product announcement 
Finally, we investigate whether the absence of abnormal returns is due to the 
uncertainty and highly technical information inherent to patents that make them 
difficult to be evaluated by the market. In order to test hypothesis 2, we conduct an 
event study on the event of approval of a drug itself by the FDA, rather than the 
patent for it to understand whether it is patents or innovation in general that the 
market has trouble evaluating. New molecular entities (NME) and new biological 
approvals data were collected from the FDA web page54, from 1999 to 2014. Firms 
were hand merged to CRSP data and then we conducted an event study considering a 
60 (30) days normal return estimation window with a sample of 189 (190) drug 
approvals for 87(87) different firms. 
 
TABLE 2.5 - OLS Estimation. Dependent Variable:  Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CAR).  FDA Announcements 
Estimation Window = 30 days 
Event window CARs Observations 
(-1,1) 0.059%** 190 
(-2,2) 0.055%** 190 
Estimation Window = 60 days 
Event window CARs Observations 
(-1,1) 0.374%*** 189 
(-2,2) 0.537%*** 189 
All regressions are estimated using robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
Significance:  * p< .1,  ** p<.05 ,  *** p<.01 
 
As it is shown in table 2.5, FDA approvals, on average, generated positive and 
significant CARs. An FDA drug approval generates, on average, between 0.06% and 
0.5% abnormal returns during the considered event windows. This result suggest that 
although investors may not be sophisticated enough to understand the information 
conveyed by the patent or to evaluate the prospects of a newly patented invention, 
announcements related to closer to market innovations lead to positive stock market 
54http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/Dru
gandBiologicApprovalReports/NDAandBLAApprovalReports/ucm373420.htm. Accessed: February 
2016. 
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reactions. In the case of a drug approval that may generate sales revenue in the short 
run, investors are able to recognize and assign a value to this event. Ergo, we cannot 
reject hypothesis 2. 
 
 
2.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
In this chapter, we investigate the stock market’s reaction to innovation. Using 
patents as a proxy for innovation, we investigate the stock market’s reaction to patent 
related events – application publication, allowance, and grant. We assume that the 
release of the information related to the patent event is a surprise. According to Austin 
(1993), even if the information regarding the invention and the firm’s specific 
technology direction is known, the actual day of the patent event is not known. 
Moreover, we use a broad sample of patents, and conduct an event study where the 
event windows are set around the patent event day. On average, we cannot accept 
hypothesis 1 of positive and significant abnormal returns generated due to a patent 
event. 
Therefore, we investigate different explanations for why patent events do not 
generate positive CARs. One explanation we consider is that the distribution of patent 
value is highly skewed and the positive valuation of the market may be lost in the 
averages we look at.  To test this proposition we restrict our sample to only patents 
that are subsequently proven valuable through receiving citations in the top 10% or 
1% of the citation distribution, or patents that resulted in products. For that we use a 
sample of patents related to drugs approved by the FDA – Orange Book listed patents 
and a sample of NME. Together with estimations for the top cited patents, these 
samples are considered to include valuable patents, i.e., valuable inventions. Even 
using samples of patents that are shown to be valuable later, we cannot accept the 
hypothesis of positive and significant abnormal returns.  
Considering a possible leakage of information, i.e., the value of the invention is 
already incorporated in the firm’s stock price, we investigate abnormal returns around 
the patent application publication event and the patent allowance (NOA) events. We 
do not find statistically significant CARs for the patent application publication event 
and even statistically significant, we document virtually zero abnormal returns to a 
NOA.  
 
 
57 
We interpret our results as suggesting that investors do not significantly react to 
patent-events either because it is a technical and complex document or because of the 
uncertainty regarding futures prospects of the invention.. The published patent 
document, apart from information regarding inventors, assignees, and dates, is a very 
technical document describing the invention in detail. This characteristic makes the 
patent a complex document, which prevents investors from fully understanding the 
information contained therein (Liu, 2006; Gu, 2005) and from assigning a value based 
on the future cash flows the patented invention might generate.  
Finally, we calculate abnormal returns for the event of a drug approved by the 
FDA. When the event is related to a product that is associated with immediately 
pending sales, investors are able to value expected future cash flows generated by the 
invention. This is, a closer to market innovation bears significantly less uncertainty 
than a patent that usually comes out at the beginning of an innovation project. 
Our results might seem to be at odds with the majority of previous results in the 
literature. However, we use a larger and broader sample, not restricted to a single 
industry, type of firms and events attracting media attention as Austin (1993) and Liu 
(2006) nor related to a specific firm event as Plumlee et al.(2015). Austin’s paper, for 
example, used a limited and very specific sample of patents owned by large 
biotechnology firms, making results very specific as well.  Liu (2006), in considering 
only the announced events, the sample is selected towards valuable patents, i.e., when 
a firm makes the innovation-related event announcement, it is more likely to be 
valuable.  
Moreover, we contribute to the literature with a series of robustness tests in order to 
further explain why the stock market does not react significant and positively to a 
patent grant event. Results are aligned with Ramanathan et al. (2001), however, 
instead the authors do not provide any further explanation for the sample selection, 
methodology, and robustness of their results. 
The absence of significant stock market reaction to a patent event may lead to 
innovation myopia and to resources misallocation. We propose that, investors and the 
society would benefit from the publication of an easier to access and interpret patent 
information.  
Despite the advantages of an event study in capturing stock market reactions to an 
unexpected event our study has several limitations. Of specific importance is the fact 
that the screening process required to minimize confounding effects causes 
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underrepresentation of patenting intensive industries. However, as shown in the 
literature, we would expect that the stock price of a more innovative firm already 
includes patents value. If the stock market assigns higher value to innovative efficient 
firms (Hirshleifer et al., 2013), a patent event of a firm that patent frequently might 
not be a surprise, therefore it would not generate abnormal returns. In addition, as we 
estimated longer event windows for NOA it may be that confounding effects happen 
to be included in the event window and drive our results. With these caveats, we think 
our study has a clear contribution to the patent valuation literature as it provides a 
direct measure of investors’ ability to understand and value the information conveyed 
by the patent document. 
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Chapter 3 
When diversification meets value:  
Technological diversification, technology 
categories, and firm value  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Innovation generates economic growth (Grossman and Helpman, 1993) and 
improves the performance of the innovating firm (Klette and Kortum, 2004; Geroski 
et al., 1993). Moreover, investing in research and development (R&D) enable firms to 
build absorptive capacity, generate innovations, and to succeed in the market place 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990, Stock et al., 2001). Further, previous research shows that 
firms’ technological diversification promotes innovation (Garcia-Vega, 2006; Leten et 
al., 2007). Thus, a firm investing in technological diversification becomes more 
innovative and better able to respond to market changes and, therefore, increasing its 
future viability. Then, technological diversification might affect firm’s expected 
future performance, reflected on a positive market valuation.  
This study investigates the effect of the degree of technological diversification on 
firms’ market value55 in R&D intensive industries, measuring technological 
diversification by firms’ patents technology classification, during 1992-2007. In 
addition, I look at differences in investors’ evaluation of technological diversification 
by technology categories. I find that the effect of technological diversification on firm 
value differs between technology categories. 
Diversifying technologically means increasing the range of technology areas of a 
firm’s technology base (Granstrand and Oskarsson, 1994). Then, it requires resources, 
physical and knowledge based, to develop and take advantage of technology cross-
fertilization (Granstrand, 1998; Leten et al., 2007). Despite developing and acquiring 
internal ability to use a broad range of technologies, it also requires managers to 
coordinate and integrate multidisciplinary R&D (Granstrand and Oskarsson, 1994).  
Granstrand (1998) argue that technology, as one kind of knowledge, is part of a 
firm’s resources and, therefore, part of a firm’s intangible capital. The relationship 
between firm value and intangible assets is well established in the literature. 
Considering the uncertain and risky nature of R&D and the innovative activity (Kline 
and Rosenberg, 1986), the financial markets’ forward looking valuation of firm assets 
and investments is considered appropriate to value investment in R&D and intangible 
assets (Toivane et al. 2002). Previous evidence shows that, a positive and significant 
55 Throughout this chapter, market value and Tobin’s q are used interchangeably, unless stated 
otherwise. Tobin’s q is defined as the ratio of market value over replacement costs. 
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relationship exists between firm market value and R&D investments (e.g., Gleason 
and Klock, 2006; Chan et al., 2001; Blundell et al., 1999; Cockburn and Griliches, 
1988; Griliches, 1981) and patents (e.g., Hall et al., 2005; Cockburn and Griliches, 
1988; Blundell et al., 1999). 
Regarding firm diversification strategies, product or business diversification might 
be motivated by the possibility of generating economies of scope, spreading and 
reducing risks and, sustaining firm growth (Cantweel et al., 2004). Moreover, firm 
diversification requires firms to coordinate and share new and existing assets (Zhou, 
2011). On the one hand, business diversification may generate inefficiencies, having a 
negative effect on firm value (Wernefelt and Montgomery, 1988; Lang and Stulz, 
1994; Berger and Ofek; 1995). On the other hand, it may generate economies of scope 
and, therefore, yield a market premium (Villalonga, 2004b). 
However, firms might diversify technologically without business/product 
diversification (Gambardella and Torrisi, 2008; Brusoni et al., 2001), although, 
technological diversification also requires coordination and sharing of new and 
existing assets, tangible and intangible. Firms may also diversify technologically in 
order to better understand complex product systems, internally develop the different 
technologies embodied in a product, or to be able to identify and take advantage of 
new technology opportunities (Granstrand et al., 1997). Nevertheless, technological 
diversification might also create inefficiencies and resources misallocation, leading to 
losses. Ergo, is not obvious that the degree of technological diversification is 
positively associated with firm value as the future benefits generated by technological 
diversification and firm’s ability to appropriate it might depend on the characteristics 
of the technology that is produced.  
One way to classify a technology is by its returns appropriation mechanisms. The 
innovation literature describes technologies in two main categories: complex and 
discrete (Cohen et al, 2001). Complex technologies refer to products that are 
protected by many patents, generally held by different owners (e.g., electronics). On 
the other hand, discrete technologies refer to products protected by one or a few 
patents (e.g., drugs). This distinction is primarily used to identify firms’ strategic 
patenting behavior and to evaluate the efficiency of patents as a tool to appropriate the 
returns to innovation, depending on the technology protected by the patent. 
Still, the technological diversification effect on firm value might differ by 
technology characteristics because of two main reasons. First, as in complex 
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technologies it is necessary to join different technologies to ensemble a product, a 
broader technological knowledge might be necessary to understand the different parts 
of a product and to appropriate returns from innovation. Whereas, discrete 
technologies, in general, do not need to join different technologies, making 
technology diversification less influential on firm value. A second reason is the 
technology innovation cycle. The innovation cycle, i.e., how long it takes from 
turning a promising technology into realized profits, differs by industry and 
technology, and might influence how the degree of technology diversification affects 
firm value. For example, Gu (2005) points out that the innovation cycle in the biotech 
and pharmaceutical industries (discrete technologies) is longer than in other 
innovation-intensive industries, around twelve to fifteen years. Conversely, in the 
electronic industry (complex technology) innovation cycle is considerably shorter. 
Hence, technological breadth might be more relevant for technologies with a shorter 
innovation cycle. In this sense, the average effect of technological diversification on 
firm value might be misleading, as shareholders might access technological 
diversification value differently depending on the technology category. 
This study contributes to the literature on intangible assets valuation. Results show 
that technological diversification is associated with firm value beyond usual 
intangible indicators, R&D expenditure and patents. However, the value effect is 
mainly driven by the positive effect that technological diversification has on firm 
value for the electronic industry. Additionally, I show that the effect of the degree of 
technological diversification on firm value is asymmetrical, being positive for 
electronics and not significant for chemicals. To the best of my knowledge, this is the 
first study to investigate the effect of technological diversification on firm value 
considering different technology categories. 
In the following section, I discuss the theoretical background and propose the 
hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 presents the data and variables descriptions and 
section 4 the empirical results. In section 5, I discuss the results and finally section 6 
concludes with some implications, limitations, and future research. 
 
3.2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
3.2.1 Technology diversification 
Diversification has long been discussed in the strategic management literature 
(Ramanujam and Varadarajan, 1989). Earlier works focus primarily on 
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product/business diversification, defining it as the variety of products, industries, or 
markets that a firm caters to (Gort, 1962; Berry 1975; Pitts and Hopkins, 1982). 
Moreover, Rumelt argues that “diversification takes place when the firm expands to 
make and sell products or a product line having no market interaction (technically, 
having zero cross price-elasticity) with each of the firm's other products” (Rumelt, p. 
363, 1982). Thus, diversification is a strategic response to the risks and uncertainties 
of being dependent on a single market (Fai, 2001). It means that by diversifying the 
firm is spreading risk and securing income when the demand for one product is 
declining.  
Together with the decision to diversify, managers also decide the direction of 
diversification. The literature identifies two main diversification strategies: vertical 
and horizontal (Ansoff, 1958; Fai, 2001). The former refers to upstream (input 
supply) or downstream (e.g., distribution channels) diversification, whereas the latter 
refers to output/product/market diversification. Likewise, some authors have 
differentiated between related and unrelated diversification (Chari et al., 2008). While 
related diversification presents opportunities to share resources and capabilities, 
unrelated diversification demands different resources and capabilities. Related 
diversification implies that the firm takes advantage of the synergies between the 
existing resources in order to diversify into new product markets, giving rise to 
economies of scope (Zhou, 2011). Moreover, product diversification frequently is 
justified as a response to market conditions, managers’ intent to enlarge the company, 
and strategic decisions to reduce business risks (Miller, 2004). 
Although similar, technological diversification does not imply product 
diversification (Fai, 2001). Yet, generally technological diversification precedes 
product diversification as firms diversify following the technology capabilities 
already developed, i.e., a technology related diversification (Granstrand, 1998; Miller, 
2004; Kim et al., 2016).  
Technological diversification is often looked at from the point of view of the 
resource-based view (RBV) of the firm, as it involves the acquisition or the 
development of new knowledge, skills and routines. Further, the RBV theory stresses 
the importance of intangible resource endowments to achieve sustainable performance 
(Villalonga, 2004c). Accordingly, the existence of indivisible, difficult to imitate, and 
specific assets gives the firm a competitive advantage (Barney, 1991) and makes the 
firm better able to diversify technologically. The high transaction costs of firm’s 
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specific assets motivate the firm to explore them internally, diversifying into new 
technologies (Leten et al., 2007). In addition, Granstrand (1998) argues that 
technology diversification fosters firm growth by generating economies of scale, 
scope, speed, and space56.  
 
3.2.2 Technology diversification and firm value 
The evidence regarding the association between business (product/market) 
diversification and firm value is mixed, depending on the context, industry and firm 
specific characteristics (Park and Jang, 2012). Earlier work has found a negative 
association, i.e., a diversification discount. Diversification may lead to management 
and resource allocation inefficiency. Lang and Stulz (1994) using a sample of 1,449 
US firms find a negative association between firm business diversification and 
Tobin’s q throughout the 1980s, and this diversification discount is not explained by 
industry effects. Using a similar, but shorter, time span (from 1986 to 1991) and a 
sample of 3,659 US firms, Berg and Ofek (1995) also find a diversification (business) 
discount. However, the authors find that related diversification (in the same SIC two-
digit code) mitigates the negative effect of diversification. 
On the other hand, researchers claim that the diversification discount is a result of 
an estimation bias (Villalonga, 2004a). According to this view, diversification is an 
endogenous decision as it may be a result of managers’ profit seeking choices when 
the firm is not realizing profits in the current industry (Miller 2004; Villalonga, 
2004a). Villalonga (2004a), when using a propensity-score matching method to 
correct for this bias, finds that the diversification discount disappears and finds a 
diversification premium instead. Villalonga (2004b) using data from the Business 
Information Tracking Series (BITS) from 1989 to 1996 also reports a statistically 
significant diversification premium.   
More recently, scholars have looked at a nonlinear relation between intra-industry 
product diversification and firm performance, using fine-grained product 
diversification data. Zahavi and Lavie (2013) find an U-shaped effect of product 
diversity on firm performance, measured by sales growth. Moreover, this effect is 
stronger as firms invest more on R&D, and attenuated by firms’ intra-industry product 
56 Granstrand (1998) refers to economies of scale in the sense of diminishing average costs, economies 
of scope relate to technology cross-fertilization, economies of speed as the pace of a process and, 
economies of space regarding the location of the firm and externalities. 
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diversification experience. Hashai (2015) reports an S-shaped relationship between 
within-industry diversification and firm performance, measured as returns on sales. 
According to Hashai, the S-shaped relation is driven by “adjustment costs” at low 
levels of within-industry product diversification and “coordination costs” at high 
levels.  
Miller (2004, 2006) investigates the moderation role of the firm’s technological 
diversity into the relation between business diversification and firm performance. 
First, using a sample of 227 large US firms from 1980 to 1992, Miller (2004) argues 
that the observed diversification discount occurs because firms that diversified 
(product diversification) invest less in R&D and have broader technology (less 
specialized) assets than other firms in their industry prior to the diversification. Miller 
(2006) reports a positive association between firm performance and business 
diversification when the business diversification is based on technology diversity. 
On the other hand, there is no dispute regarding the positive effect of intangible 
assets on firm value. To the extent that intangible resources generate value to the firm 
it has to be reflected in the firm’s market value. Consistent with this argument, 
Griliches (1981) and Cockburn and Griliches (1988) show that patent stock and R&D 
stock have a positive effect on firm value (measured with Tobin’s q). In addition, 
R&D investment shows a larger effect than patent stock. Megna and Klock (1993) 
investigate the effect of intangible assets on firms’ value in the semiconductor 
industry. The authors find a positive effect of R&D and patent stock on firm value. 
Further, rivals’ patents have a negative effect on the market value (Tobin’s q) of the 
focal firm, while rivals’ R&D stock has a positive effect. The authors argue that 
rivals’ intangibles affect the focal firm’s market value to the extent that the returns on 
intangibles cannot be fully appropriated, generating spillover effects. Hall et al. 
(2005) use three measures of firms’ intangible assets: R&D to assets ratio, patents to 
R&D ratio and, citations to patents ratio, all stock variables. These ratios proxy for 
R&D intensity, R&D productivity, and the quality of the R&D outcome, respectively. 
Findings show that all ratios have a positive and significant effect on market value.  
In the aforementioned studies, intangible assets are proxied by R&D and patents. 
However, following Granstrand (1998), I argue that firms’ technological resources are 
also part of firms’ intangible capital and contribute significantly and beyond the usual 
variables in explaining firm value. Technological diversification indicates firms’ 
knowledge breadth which may enable them to exploit economies of scope in R&D, 
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enhance absorptive capacity by giving them access to a more diverse outside 
knowledge, reduce the risks of R&D by developing technological capacity in other 
areas, and enable the firm to extract more rents by creating more complex product and 
diverse systems (Kim et al., 2016). The literature provides evidence that technological 
diversification promotes firms’ innovation performance (Garcia-Vega, 2006; Leten et 
al., 2007; Quintana-García and Benavides-Velasco, 2008). Garcia-Vega (2006) argues 
that technological diversification enable firms to absorb R&D spillovers from others 
technology fields and reduce innovation risk, creating incentives to increase R&D 
expenditure. However, Leten et al. (2007) report an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between technology diversification and firms’ innovation performance given the high 
costs of coordination and integration that a highly technologically diversified firm 
may incur. Regarding the effect of technology diversification on financial 
performance, studies have found a positive effect on market value57, moderating the 
relation between segment diversification and market value (Miller, 2006), and a 
positive direct effect on return on assets, profitability (Lin et al., 2006), and sales 
growth (Kim et al., 2016).  
Then, as the degree of technological diversification is part of a firm’s intangible 
capital, it has to be included on firm’s market value. Therefore, in analyzing R&D 
intensive firms, hypothesis one states: 
 
H1: On average, the degree of technological diversification has a positive 
effect on firm’s Tobin’s q. 
 
Technology diversity involves developing and/or acquiring new knowledge. As 
such it might also require a large amount of investment. Considering the risks and 
uncertainty inherent to the innovation activity, Kim et al. (2016) highlight the 
importance of technology diversity for a firm as a way to diversify risks and be able 
to quickly adapt to demand changes, especially in a fast-changing environment. 
Quintana-García and Benavides-Velasco (2008) investigate the effect of technology 
diversification on firm’s innovation performance in the US biotechnology industry. 
The authors find that technological diversification has a stronger effect on exploratory 
57 In this paper, the author measures market value as the nominator of Tobin’s q ratio, i.e., the price of 
outstanding common shares times the number of shares plus the book value of preferred stock plus the 
book value of debt.   
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inventions because a broader technological knowledge enables recombination of old 
knowledge and the solution of complex problems. 
The literature has stressed the differences between technologies regarding the 
appropriability of the returns to innovation. Cohen et al. (2000) differentiate between 
discrete and complex technologies, where the former is characterized by one product 
protected by one or a few patents, and the latter is characterized by many 
complementary patents, typically held by different owners, protecting one product. A 
typical example of a discrete technology product is a chemical or a drug, where one or 
a few patents protect one molecule or structure, and these patents are generally held 
by a single owner. The consumer electronics industry is a typical example of complex 
technology, as many parts are protected by patents, forming a single device (Baron 
and Delcamp, 2010). 
The difference in technology characteristics may influence the need for 
technological diversification and its impact on firm market value. For example, 
technological diversification may be more relevant in complex industries, where a 
product embodies many different technologies. On the other hand, a firm operating in 
a discrete industry, where products embody few and specific technologies, may 
require deeper rather than broader technological knowledge. Gambardela and Torrisi 
(1998) investigate the effect of technological diversification on firms’ accounting 
performance measures in the electronics industry. The authors find that, for a sample 
of the 32 largest US and European firms in the electronic industry during 1984-1992, 
technological diversification had a positive effect on firm performance, sales and 
profits.  
Besides differences regarding returns appropriation, complex and discrete 
technologies differ in the innovation cycle length. While discrete technology products 
take a long time between the idea materialization and profits realization, this time is 
shorter for complex technology products (Gu, 2005). It means that, in order to remain 
competitive firms need to be able to adapt and to quickly respond to market changes. 
Therefore, technological diversification might be more crucial in determining future 
viability for complex technologies.   
Consequently, the impact of technological diversification on the market value of 
the firm is not homogeneous across industries. It depends on the technology 
characteristics and how relevant is the degree of technological diversification to 
generate future cash flow streams. Complex technologies might derive a greater 
 
 
68 
benefit from technological diversification than discrete technologies. Indeed, in the 
discrete technology industries the degree of technological diversification may not 
provide additional information regarding a firm’s intangible capital. Thus, the second 
hypothesis state that: 
 
H2: The positive effect of technological diversification is stronger for 
complex technology industries than for discrete technology industries. 
 
 
3.3 METHODS 
3.3.1 Data and sample selection 
This chapter investigates the effects of technological diversification on the market 
value of R&D intensive firms. I use patent data from EPO’s Worldwide Patent 
Statistical Database April 2012 (“PATSTAT”) and firm level data from Compustat. 
My sample includes observations of firms that have a patent granted up to 201058. I 
constructed a panel of patenting firms that patent at least in two consecutive years and 
have at least 5 years of available information in Compustat between 1992 and 2007. 
R&D intensive firms were defined as the ones whose primary two digit SIC code is 
28 (chemicals and allied products), 35 (industrial and commercial machinery and 
computer equipment), 36 (electronic and other electrical equipment and components, 
except computer equipment), 37 (transportation equipment), and 38 (measuring, 
analyzing and controlling instruments; photographic, medical and optical goods; 
watches and clocks) (Coad and Rao, 2008; Bernstein and Mamuneas, 2006). The final 
sample includes 1,304 firms in an unbalanced panel with 12,432 observations. 
 
3.3.2 Measures 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of Tobin’s q, defined as the ratio of market 
value to replacement value. Calculated as in Chung and Pruitt (1994), using 
Compustat data. I follow Villalonga and Amit (2006) and treat a Tobin’s q greater 
than 10 as an outlier, dropping observations in this case. The relation between 
intangible assets and market value (Tobin’s q) has been studied previously (e.g., 
58 Using Kogan et al. (2011) data, US patents granted up to 2010 were matched to Compustat using 
CRSP permnos and gvkeys concordance table. 
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Griliches, 1981; Hall et al., 2005), where the natural logarithm of q is a linear and 
additive function of variables accounting for tangible and intangible assets. Moreover, 
according to Villalonga (2004c), using the natural logarithm of q avoid the pitfall of 
considering constant returns to scale in intangible assets investments. 
 
Technological diversification 
The main independent variable is the degree of technological diversification (TD). 
This index is calculated based on the International Patent Classification (IPC59). 
Examiners assign each patent to different IPC classes, according to the technology 
described in the patent document. Additionally, most of the patents are classified in 
many IPC classes what means that a given invention embraces many technologies. In 
order to capture the different technologies used to build a patented invention, an 
entropy index (Kim et al., 2016) was calculated using a firm’s share of IPCs at the 6-
digits (main group) level over all IPCs 6-digit classifications of a firm’s patent 
applications in a given year60. As Aharonson and Schilling (2016) argue, a measure 
that considers patent subclasses provides a better picture of the firm’s technology. 
 
𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓 = � 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 ln � 1𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 �6668
𝑖𝑖=1  
 
where 𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓   is firm i’s IPC 6-digit share for group k at time t (𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 = 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓⁄  and 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓  
is equal to the total number of IPCs 6-digit level assigned to firm i’s patents at time t).  
A moving average of three-years was used for each year observation to diminish 
concerns regarding noise and fluctuations of patent application and number of IPC 
classification assigned to patents (Kim et al., 2016). Moreover, using a three-year 
moving average lessens endogeneity concerns regarding simultaneity of technological 
diversification and firm performance.  
 
 
59 The IPC is a hierarchical classification of patents according to the technology categories they belong. 
For example, C01B 5/02 indicates a complete classification symbol, where C represents the section 
symbol, C01 the class symbol, C01B the subclass and, C01B 5/00 the main group. The last two digits 
narrow down the domain of the technology. 
60 In the sample of patents matched to Compustat there were 6668 different IPC 6-digits classes. 
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Control variables 
The amount of R&D expenses indicates the firm’s commitment to innovative 
activity. However, R&D outcomes may take time to be developed, commercialized, 
and then generate value to the firm (Hall et al., 2005). Nevertheless, it is established 
that R&D investment has a positive effect on firm market value (e.g., Griliches, 1981; 
Hall et al., 2005). Therefore, I include R&D intensity (R&Dt), measured as the ratio 
of R&D expenses to total assets in a given year (Miller, 2006). Moreover, I include 
R&D intensity lagged one year (R&Dt-1), accounting for the time lag between the 
investment in R&D and the R&D output61.  
As the key independent variable is calculated based on patent applications, I control 
for the number of patents applied by firm i (TOTAL) in a given year. Not controlling 
for the number of patent applications could bias our results, as a firm that patents 
more is more likely to have a higher TD index.  
Additionally, following recent studies on diversification using market-based 
measures of performance (Miller, 2006), I include control variables common to this 
literature. Capital intensity, as the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets, gives an 
additional measure of tangible assets and is positively related to firm value. A firm’s 
financial constraint is measured as an indicator variable equal to one if the firm did 
not pay dividends in a given year (DIVID_NP) (Lang and Stulz, 1994).  The leverage 
variable is measured as the ratio of the book value of debt to market value, defined as 
the number of outstanding common shares times the price at the close of the year. 
Further, I control for other factors that can affect firm value as, profitability (the ratio 
of net income to sales), size (natural logarithm of a firm’s number of employees) 
(Berger and Ofek, 1995), and age62 (Kim et al., 2016). Finally, market share (MKT 
SHARE), measured at the 2-digit SIC code level, proxy for a firm’s efficiency in 
production and innovation (Smirlock et al., 1984). Blundell et al. (1999) reinforce the 
efficiency hypothesis and find that the impact of innovations on a firms’ market value 
is larger for firms with a higher market share.  
 
 
61 It may be that further lags also affect firm’s value as R&D outcomes are uncertain and may take 
longer than two years to generate a marketable innovation. However, it is out of the scope of this study 
to investigate the effect of R&D lags on Tobin’s q. 
62 Age is a proxy variable calculated from when the firm appears in Compustat data to the focal year. 
My Compustat data runs from 1984 to 2013. 
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3.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
3.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.1 and 3.2 display the descriptive statistics and the correlations for all 
variables in the full sample of firms from 1992 to 2007. Technology diversification 
(TD) index ranges from 0 to 7.733, where the higher the index, the more 
technologically diversified a firm is. Regarding R&D intensity, past and current R&D 
have similar means, indicating the stickiness of R&D investment. Moreover, only 
3.86% of the firm-year observations did not report R&D expenses (Dummy R&D=0).   
From table 3.2, the correlation between R&D (log) and size and between sales (log) 
and size – 0.72 and 0.88, respectively – are high but do not represent any threat, as 
these variables do not enter simultaneously as explanatory variables in the regressions 
shown below. Although, most of the correlations are lower than 0.7, TD has a high 
correlation with size (0.66), market share (0.49), and with the total of yearly patent 
applications (0.45)63. 
 
TABLE 3.1 – Descriptive statistics 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES N MEAN SD DEVIATION MIN MEDIAN MAX 
       TD 12,432 2.360 1.387 0 2.197 7.733 
TD (HHI) 12,432 0.745 0.252 0 0.829 0.996 
TD4 12,432 1.593 1.003 0 1.482 5.325 
TOBIN'S q 12,432 0.838 0.584 -5.583 0.796 2.294 
TOBIN'S q t-1 11,128 0.847 0.584 -5.583 0.804 2.294 
BUSINESS DIVERSIFICATION 12,432 2.181 1.962 0 1 21 
TOTAL 12,432 51.14 200.9 1 6 4,295 
PROFITABILITY 12,290 -5.268 129.9 -11,909 0.0333 71.59 
PROFITABILITYt-1 11,002 -4.312 75.42 -4,940 0.0331 71.59 
LEVERAGE 12,431 7.011 527.4 0 0.0725 41,910 
R&D 12,432 0.126 0.185 0 0.0755 5.760 
R&Dt-1 12,432 0.129 0.197 0 0.0755 5.893 
SIZE 12,204 1.328 1.355 0 0.796 6.621 
AGE 12,432 11.54 5.249 1 11 24 
DUMMY (R&D=0) 12,432 0.0386 0.193 0 0 1 
CAPITAL INTENSITY 12,272 0.0521 0.0477 0 0.0393 0.625 
DIVIDENDS NOT PAID 12,432 0.643 0.479 0 1 1 
R&D(log) 12,432 3.298 1.870 0 3.103 9.408 
MKTSHARE 12,428 0.000 1.000 -0.321 -0.289 13.75 
SALES (Log) 12,290 5.516 2.591 -6.908 5.553 12.48 
 
63 All variables included in the models have variance inflated factors (VIF) below the usual cut off 
value of 5. 
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 3.4.2 Regression results 
First, in line with Granstrand and Oskarsson (1994) and Gambradela and Torrisi 
(1998), I regressed sales (log) on the degree of technological diversification (TD 
index), R&D (log) expenses, size, age, with industry and year fixed effects. Results64 
(not tabulated) indicate a positive association between sales and the TD index, for the 
sample of R&D intensive industries. However, this result must be seen with caution 
as sales are measured at the aggregate level. More accurate measures of sales, 
embodying diversified technologies, require in depth surveys with more detailed 
information. Nonetheless, this preliminary result gives a flavor of the overall positive 
relation between technological diversification and sales. 
Turning to the main analysis investigating the relationship between Tobin’s q and 
TD, table 3.3 column 1 displays the results for the full sample of R&D intensive firms 
and column 2 and 3 the results for the chemical and electronic industries, respectively. 
Equations were estimated using the random effects model, accounting for the panel 
structure of the data. The random effects model is preferred to the fixed effects model 
because technology diversification, the main independent variable, changes slowly 
over time. Therefore, a fixed effects estimation would neglect important information 
(Miller, 2006). Moreover, Hall et al. (2005) argue that when considering market value 
as the dependent variable, to assume that differences between firms are fixed may not 
be a suitable assumption as firms change their strategies in response to market 
conditions.  
The main variable of interest, the degree of TD index is positive for all samples, 
although statistically significant for the full sample and for the electronic industry 
subsample. Further, the coefficient of TD is larger65 for the electronic industry than 
for the full sample.  
 Firm size is significant and negative, in line with Schwert (1983) and Lang and 
Stulz (1994) who report a negative effect of firm size on stock returns. A proxy for 
firm age is negative and significant in column 1. Loderer and Waelchli (2010) argue 
that older firms tend to develop organizational rigidities and, therefore, may be less 
profitable. 
64 Results available upon request. 
65 𝜒𝜒2(1) = 8.31, prob>𝜒𝜒2 = 0.0039. 
 
 
73 
                                                          
TABLE 3.2 – Correlation matrix 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 TOBIN'S q 1                    
2 TD -0.13 1                   
3 TD (HHI) -0.06 0.79 1                  
4 TD4 -0.19 0.93 0.74 1                 
5 
BUSINESS 
DIVERSIFICATION 
-0.29 0.36 0.21 0.38 1 
               
6 TOBIN'S q t-1 0.77 -0.13 -0.06 -0.18 -0.29 1               
7 PROFITABILITYt-1 -0.05 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.05 1              
8 SIZE -0.37 0.66 0.38 0.65 0.52 -0.36 0.05 1             
9 AGE -0.19 0.17 0.11 0.19 0.32 -0.19 0.02 0.33 1            
10 R&D(log) -0.09 0.69 0.45 0.62 0.36 -0.06 0.01 0.72 0.25 1           
11 R&D 0.3 -0.09 -0.03 -0.13 -0.22 0.3 -0.17 -0.33 -0.19 0 1          
12 R&Dt-1 0.32 -0.1 -0.04 -0.14 -0.21 0.32 -0.13 -0.33 -0.21 -0.04 0.62 1         
13 DUMMY (R&D=0) -0.09 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 0.03 -0.09 0.01 0 0.03 -0.35 -0.14 -0.13 1        
14 LEVERAGE -0.03 -0.01 0 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 1       
15 PROFITABILITY -0.03 0.01 0 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.31 0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.08 -0.06 0.01 0 1      
16 
DIVIDENDS NOT 
PAID 
0.27 -0.36 -0.21 -0.39 -0.33 0.27 -0.03 -0.59 -0.29 -0.29 0.29 0.28 -0.06 0 -0.03 1     
17 
CAPITAL 
INTENSITY 
0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.07 0.03 0.08 -0.13 0.02 -0.02 -0.08 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.02 1    
18 MKTSHARE -0.21 0.49 0.23 0.49 0.33 -0.21 0.02 0.66 0.18 0.54 -0.13 -0.12 -0.02 0 0.01 -0.32 0.02 1   
19 TOTAL -0.1 0.45 0.2 0.4 0.26 -0.1 0.01 0.46 0.14 0.45 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 0 0.01 -0.2 0.07 0.6 1  
20 SALES (Log) -0.39 0.57 0.35 0.57 0.47 -0.37 0.16 0.88 0.39 0.66 -0.48 -0.48 0.04 0.01 0.14 -0.54 0.08 0.51 0.36 1 
Note: All correlations are significant at 5% except the ones in bold. Obs.: 12,432 
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Regarding the relationship between R&D investment and firm market value, a 
positive and significant association is well documented in the literature (Griliches, 
1981; Cockburn and Griliches, 1988; Hall et al., 2005). Overall, R&D and R&Dt-1 are 
positive and significantly associated with Tobin’s q. The effect of R&D on firm 
market value reflects the discounted future cash flows that may be generated by the 
R&D expenditure. Considering the time needed to generate innovation outputs, past 
R&D expenditure is more relevant in generating current cash flows and, therefore, has 
a greater effect on current q.  
Hall (1993) reports a decrease in the market valuation of R&D investment during 
the nineteen-eighties. However, I expect that any trend or shock that affects market 
valuation may affect all firms in the sample equally and then be included in the year 
fixed effects. Finding no relation between the number of patents applied and the value 
of a firm goes in line with previous literature, which establishes that simple patent 
counts are not (or weakly) correlated with firm value (Hall et. al., 2005) 
Column 2 and 3 in table 3.3 displays the results by industry, chemical (SIC 28) and 
electronic (SIC 36). When investigating the effect of technology diversification by 
industry, we observe that technology diversification has a positive and significant 
impact on firm value in the electronics industry, whereas in the chemical industry 
technological diversification is not significantly related to firm value. As 
hypothesized, being more technologically diversified matters, especially in the case of 
complex technology industries. Firms with a larger technology breadth might be 
better able to quickly adapt to changes in the industry.  
The electronic industry is characterized by a dynamic environment: both from the 
demand side requiring different devices and machineries and from the supply side, 
i.e., the competitive environment where firms have to compete meeting downstream 
requirements. In this context, being technologically diversified means that the firm 
has a broad technological knowledge and can respond quickly to market changes 
(Gambardela and Torrisi, 1998).  
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TABLE 3.3 – Random effects panel models for Tobin’s q 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Full sample SIC 28 SIC36 
        
TD 0.016** 0.001 0.033** 
 
(0.006) (0.010) (0.012) 
SIZE -0.134*** -0.126*** -0.165*** 
 
(0.014) (0.027) (0.024) 
AGE -0.013*** -0.000 -0.011* 
 
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) 
R&D 0.084* 0.186*** -0.182 
 
(0.041) (0.036) (0.221) 
R&Dt-1 0.189*** 0.161*** 0.755*** 
 
(0.047) (0.031) (0.159) 
DUMMY(R&D=0) -0.051 -0.130 -0.114 
 
(0.039) (0.082) (0.074) 
LEVERAGE -0.000 -0.412*** -0.009 
 
(0.013) (0.077) (0.096) 
PROFITABILITY -0.000 -0.000 0.005 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.006) 
DIVIDENDS NOT PAID -0.004 -0.029 -0.092** 
 
(0.022) (0.072) (0.033) 
CAPITAL INTENSITY 0.801*** 0.313 0.681*** 
 
(0.146) (0.246) (0.205) 
MKT SHAREa 0.030* 0.080 0.012 
 
(0.014) (0.055) (0.037) 
TOTAL 0.000+ 0.000 0.000* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
YEAR FE Included Included Included 
INDUSTRY FE Included 
  Constant 1.072*** 1.202*** 0.835*** 
 
(0.041) (0.093) (0.078) 
    Observations 11,948 3,087 3,095 
Number of comp 1,296 343 330 
R-squared_overall 0.246 0.354 0.209 
𝜒𝜒2 1573 630.7 613.4 
Prob > 𝜒𝜒2 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis (500 repetitions). ***p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, a p<0.1 
a Standardized variable. 
 
The electronic products are classified as complex products, where many different 
agents might own the inventions embodied in a single product. Technological 
diversification is not only necessary to speed up demand response but also to be able 
to put together the different parts that make up a product. Indeed, if the technology is 
complex the firm needs to understand the different parts that compose a product to be 
able to produce products that comply with the specifications and that fit together. 
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Therefore, in a complex technology industry, a narrow technology base may hamper 
firms’ ability to explore new technology opportunities (Hashai, 2015). Column 3 in 
table 3.3 shows that technological diversification has a positive and significant effect 
on market value.  
On the other hand, results show that being technologically diversified has no effect 
on firms’ market value for the chemical industry. Chemical industries are 
characterized by being more able to appropriate returns from innovation through 
patenting (Mansfield, 1986). Although, technology diversity as measured by patents’ 
technological classes has a non-significant effect on firm value, current and past R&D 
expenditures do have a positive and significant effect. It suggests that, in the case of 
the chemical industry, characterized by discrete technologies, investors value the 
amount of resources allocated to research regardless of how diversified is the output. 
 
3.4.3 Robustness 
I conducted several robustness tests. First, I considered two possible sources of 
endogeneity, reverse causality and omitted variable bias. Managers learn from stock 
prices (Chen at al., 2007) and then take decisions based on previous stock market 
valuation. Then, to mitigate reverse causality concerns, I included the lag of the 
dependent variable, which also controls for heterogeneity assigned to the firm’s past 
performance (Zahavi and Lavie, 2013). Table 3.4, columns 1 to 3 report the results. 
Overall results do not change, albeit the coefficient for the TD index is almost half for 
the electronic industry sample, still the relation between TD and Tobin’s q is positive 
and significant for this industry. Another possible source of endogeneity comes from 
an omitted variable bias. In all estimations I included R&D intensity and capital 
intensity, which might also influence the ability of a firm to diversify technologically. 
However, in the absence of an instrument that affects technological diversification but 
not directly Tobin’s q, this study is silent on causality claims.  
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TABLE 3.4 – Random effects panel models for Tobin’s q (Additional controls) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Full sample SIC 28 SIC36 Full sample SIC 28 SIC36 
              
TD 0.014*** 0.002 0.019** 0.015*** 0.003 0.021** 
 
(0.004) (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.009) (0.007) 
BUSINESS DIVERSIFICATION 
   
-0.011*** -0.018** -0.010** 
   
(0.002) (0.006) (0.004) 
TOBIN'S q t-1 0.722*** 0.646*** 0.700*** 0.718*** 0.632*** 0.696*** 
 
(0.014) (0.032) (0.025) (0.014) (0.032) (0.027) 
SIZE -0.026*** -0.014 -0.032** -0.020*** -0.008 -0.028* 
 
(0.006) (0.014) (0.010) (0.005) (0.016) (0.011) 
AGE 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002+ 0.003 0.002 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
R&D 0.116** 0.193*** -0.203 0.115** 0.189*** -0.206 
 
(0.039) (0.041) (0.209) (0.038) (0.037) (0.208) 
R&Dt-1 0.059 0.020 0.582** 0.055 0.018 0.590** 
 
(0.050) (0.039) (0.195) (0.052) (0.037) (0.200) 
DUMMY(R&D=0) -0.056** -0.002 -0.094* -0.053** -0.000 -0.091+ 
 
(0.017) (0.047) (0.046) (0.018) (0.046) (0.053) 
LEVERAGE -0.000 -0.284*** -0.006 -0.000 -0.275*** -0.006 
 
(0.009) (0.060) (0.052) (0.008) (0.059) (0.058) 
PROFITABILITY 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) 
PROFITABILITYt-1 0.000 0.000 -0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.004 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) 
DIVIDENDS NOT PAID 0.008 0.038 -0.032 0.006 0.034 -0.033 
 
(0.010) (0.038) (0.020) (0.010) (0.040) (0.021) 
CAPITAL INTENSITY -0.237* -0.432* -0.123 -0.261** -0.419* -0.143 
 
(0.094) (0.174) (0.147) (0.098) (0.187) (0.142) 
MKT SHAREa -0.010* 0.028 -0.035+ -0.010+ 0.038 -0.030+ 
 
(0.005) (0.027) (0.018) (0.005) (0.026) (0.018) 
TOTAL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
YEAR FE Included Included Included Included Included Included 
INDUSTRY FE Included 
  
Included 
  Constant 0.222*** 0.299*** 0.274*** 0.234*** 0.332*** 0.280*** 
 
(0.027) (0.055) (0.041) (0.027) (0.064) (0.043) 
       Observations 10,674 2,733 2,784 10,674 2,733 2,784 
Number of comp 1,293 340 330 1,293 340 330 
R-squared_overall 0.638 0.661 0.605 0.639 0.663 0.606 
𝜒𝜒2 11490 3692 3063 12079 4419 2625 
Prob > 𝜒𝜒2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis (500 repetitions). ***p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05,  
a p<0.1 
a Standardized variable. 
 
In addition, one may argue that firms diversify technologically because they are 
diversified business wise. Hence, I included the number of business segments of a 
firm, as recorded in the Compustat Segments File. As it has been already documented 
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in the literature (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berg and Ofek, 1995) business diversification 
is negatively associated with firm value. However, the relationship between TD and 
Tobin’s q, remain significant for the full sample and the electronic industry sample 
(table 3.4, column 4 to 6). Further, I added the past profitability, resulting not 
significant in any specification. Including business diversification, lagged dependent 
variable, and lagged profitability changed the sign and significance level of lagged 
R&D, standardized market share, and capital intensity. Although it may require 
further investigation, it is out of the scope of this study to analyze the interrelationship 
of these variables. Moreover, the variable of interest (TD) stays robust. 
I also used alternative measures of technological diversification. First, the same 
index was calculated using IPC classes at the four-digit level (TD4), while 
considering all classifications assigned to a given patent. Second, equations were 
estimated using a Herfindahl-Hirschman index type measuring the concentration of 
patents in a given technology (Quintana-García and Benavides-Velasco, 2008; 
Malerba and Orsenigo, 1997; Leten et al., 2007; Grandstrand and Oskarsson, 1994; 
Gambardella and Torrisi, 1998).  
Table 3.5 presents the results using the two alternative measures. While the 
technological diversification coefficients were significant at lower levels (p<0.10), the 
sign of the coefficients remain the same. Moreover, while electronic firms have a 
premium by diversifying, results suggest technological diversification has a neutral or 
even a negative effect on firm value for firms in the chemical industry. 
 
3.5 DISCUSSION 
This chapter investigates the effect of technology diversification on firm’s market 
value in R&D intensive industries. Using a sample of 1,304 US publicly traded firms, 
during 1992-2007, I constructed a technological diversification index (TD) based on 
patents technology classification (IPC). Moreover, the index is calculated using IPC 
6-digits classification level (main group), which is a more disaggregated level aiming 
to capture not only technological area diversification but also diversification inside a 
given area. As expected, technological diversification has a positive effect on the 
value of firms in the sample of R&D intensive industries. However, when analyzing 
two subsamples of different technologies, electronics and chemicals, the effect of 
technological diversification on firms’ market value differs. 
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TABLE 3.5 – Random effects panel models for Tobin’s q (Alternative measures of 
technological diversification)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Full sample SIC 28 SIC36 Full sample SIC 28 SIC36 
              
TD (HHI)a 0.051** 0.013 0.061* 
   
 
(0.016) (0.041) (0.030) 
   TD4 
   
0.008+ -0.015 0.021* 
    
(0.005) (0.012) (0.010) 
BUSINESS DIVERSIFICATION -0.011*** -0.018*** -0.010* -0.011*** -0.017** -0.010** 
 
(0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 
TOBIN'S q t-1 0.719*** 0.632*** 0.701*** 0.720*** 0.630*** 0.699*** 
 
(0.015) (0.031) (0.027) (0.015) (0.031) (0.027) 
SIZE -0.014** -0.007 -0.019* -0.013* -0.001 -0.023* 
 
(0.005) (0.016) (0.010) (0.006) (0.015) (0.012) 
AGE 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.002 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
R&D 0.115** 0.189*** -0.188 0.118** 0.190*** -0.199 
 
(0.036) (0.040) (0.202) (0.039) (0.040) (0.206) 
R&Dt-1 0.057 0.018 0.599** 0.057 0.019 0.594** 
 
(0.048) (0.037) (0.188) (0.050) (0.042) (0.196) 
DUMMY(R&D=0) -0.056** -0.001 -0.094+ -0.057*** -0.005 -0.092+ 
 
(0.017) (0.041) (0.049) (0.017) (0.046) (0.051) 
LEVERAGE -0.000 -0.275*** -0.006 -0.000 -0.276*** -0.006 
 
(0.008) (0.055) (0.058) (0.006) (0.056) (0.060) 
PROFITABILITY 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) 
PROFITABILITYt-1 0.000 0.000 -0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.004 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) 
DIVIDENDS NOT PAID 0.006 0.034 -0.034+ 0.006 0.033 -0.032 
 
(0.010) (0.038) (0.020) (0.011) (0.039) (0.020) 
CAPITAL INTENSITY -0.263** -0.420* -0.139 -0.260** -0.402* -0.125 
 
(0.095) (0.180) (0.147) (0.096) (0.175) (0.145) 
MKT SHAREb -0.009+ 0.037 -0.031+ -0.010+ 0.029 -0.033 
 
(0.005) (0.027) (0.019) (0.005) (0.026) (0.021) 
TOTAL 0.000 0.000 0.000+ 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
YEAR FE Included Included Included Included Included Included 
INDUSTRY FE Included 
  
Included 
  Constant 0.226*** 0.329*** 0.267*** 0.250*** 0.361*** 0.287*** 
 
(0.030) (0.066) (0.047) (0.030) (0.058) (0.043) 
       Observations 10,674 2,733 2,784 10,674 2,733 2,784 
Number of comp 1,293 340 330 1,293 340 330 
R-squared_overall 0.639 0.663 0.605 0.639 0.663 0.605 
Chi2 14518 3863 2798 12380 3850 2813 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis (500 repetitions). ***p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05,  
a p<0.1. 
a This index is the inverse of the HHI (TD_HHI=1-HHITD) 
b Standardized variable. 
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 As noted before, technological diversification may or may not lead to business 
diversification (Granstrand and Oskarsson, 1994; Miller, 2006). Nevertheless, when 
diversifying technologically a firm has to acquire and/or develop new technological 
capabilities, i.e., the knowledge to use a new technology. This knowledge is not only 
embodied in new machinery but mainly tacit and requires hiring personnel and/or 
investing in training. Therefore, a firm that has a greater degree of technology 
diversification is better able to use this knowledge on existing products and to take 
advantage of technological opportunities (Granstrand et al., 1997).  
Measuring firms’ market value by Tobin’s q, i.e., using a forward-looking 
performance measure, aims to capture how shareholders value firms’ technological 
diversification (Bharadwaj et al., 1999). A positive effect on q reflects the belief that 
technological diversification has a positive impact on firms’ future cash flows. 
Although, previous literature has shown a positive effect of intangible assets on q, 
diversifying technologically also demands high investment and does not necessarily 
generate high returns. However, by diversifying technologically firms create internal 
capabilities to understand complex product systems and to cope with ever changing 
consumer demands (Granstrand et al., 1997).   
Indeed, empirical results show that the market values positively technological 
diversification. However, this valuation differs by technology characteristics of the 
industry. On the one hand, stock market investors do not significantly value 
technological diversification in the chemical industry (discrete technology), but R&D 
intensity has a positive effect. This result suggests that on discrete technology 
industries investors value the commitment to R&D activities but not patenting in 
multiple technological areas. On the other hand, the effect of technological 
diversification on firms’ value for electronic industry (complex technology) is larger 
than the average effect on the firms’ value of the full sample of R&D intensive 
industries. It suggests that, in complex technologies, the market values firms that are 
more able to understand a broad range of technologies and to comply with customer 
demands. Technological diversification might signals firms’ technological 
competences and their broad spectrum of intangible assets (knowledge and diverse 
technology patents). 
These results are robust to different specifications and alternative measures of 
technological diversification. Moreover, the degree of TD has an effect on firms’ 
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market value even after controlling for R&D intensity, capital intensity, and yearly 
patent applications that account for other types of firms’ assets.  
 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
This study contributes to the literature on technological diversification. Despite a 
large number of studies on business and product diversification (e.g., Ramanujam and 
Varadarajan, 1989; Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2016), the focus on technological 
diversification is recent and scarce (e.g., Granstrand and Oskarsson, 1994; Kim et al., 
2016). Using a large sample of US firms in R&D intensive industries over a period of 
16 years, results show that there is a premium to technologically diversified firms. 
Further, the technological diversification premium differs by the technology 
characteristic of the industry, being significantly positive for complex technologies 
but not significant for discrete technologies. 
Findings suggest that technological diversification matters when the innovation 
cycle is shorter, for example in the case of electronic industry. In this case, investors 
interpret a higher degree of technological diversification as increasing the future 
viability of the firm. In contrast, for the chemical industry, where the innovation cycle 
is longer, investors do not assess the degree of technological diversification as 
indicating a source of future cash inflows. 
The main contribution of this study is to point out differences between 
technologies on how technological diversification is associated with firm value. If 
patenting in different technological classes is positively correlated with firm value, 
then not investing in technological diversification could hamper firms’ ability to 
quickly adapt to market changes, especially in the complex technology industries. 
Moreover, managers when deciding how to allocate resources, in complex industries 
investing in technological diversification might generate value to the firm.  
Still, this study has some limitations. First, by using Tobin’s q as a measure of 
firms’ value, the usual limitations of a market-based measure and the approximation 
used in this research applied (Bharadwaj et al., 1999). Further, by using a patent-based 
measure of technological diversification it assumes that the technological knowledge 
of a firm is reflected in its patents. However, as it is known, not all innovations and all 
firm knowledge is embodied in patents (Griliches, 1990), therefore, a patent-based 
measure in fact captures only the patented knowledge. Brusoni et al. (2001) show that 
even single-product firms are technologically diversified in order to coordinate with 
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suppliers. Hence, patent indicators might capture different information depending on 
the technology protected by the patent. Thus, the difference in market valuation might 
be a result of strategic considerations regarding the patented technology.  
The findings of this study calls for future research in many venues. First, even the 
literature has talked about short and long innovation cycles relating to the industry 
(Gu, 2005), as the industry level used in this study (SIC 2-digit) aggregates many 
different firms a more direct measure of innovation cycle could be adopted. Hirschey 
et al. (2001) propose a measure base on the time lag between citing and cited patents. 
Regarding the technological diversification, differentiating related and unrelated 
technological diversification (Kim et al., 2016) also might improve our understanding 
on the effect of technological diversification on firm value. Moreover, the firm 
innovating strategies, exploitative or explorative, might also influence market 
reaction. Finally, a question that remains to be answered is if the innovative activity of 
the firm, how innovative the firm is, plays a moderating role between technological 
diversification and firm value.  
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Appendix A 
 
Appendix for “Patent value in financial markets: An Event 
Study” 
 
A.1 DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
 
TABLE A.1 – Definition of variables 
Dependent variable     
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)   
Independent variables    Source 
BCITES Number  of cited patents (backward  citations). NBER 
FCITES 
Number  of forward citations  received received 
by a patent. 
NBER 
IPCNUM Number  of 4-digit IPC classes. NBER 
TPF 
Categorical  variable  = 1 if the patent was filed 
at the European  Patent Office (EPO), the 
Japanese  Patent Office (JPO) and granted  at the 
U.S. Patent Office (USPTO). Triadic  patent 
families  
 
OECD†  
HHI 
Herfindahl  index calculated  based on SIC 3 
digits. 
COMPUSTAT 
q Tobin’s q (Chung,  1994). COMPUSTAT 
Controls     
PATSTOCK 
Number of granted patents applied for by a 
given firm, from 1976, to the time of application 
publication/ patent grant event.  own calculations/NBER 
ANALYST Number of analysts covering the firm.  
I/B/E/S 
SIC 3 Categorical  variable  identifying  3-digits SIC 
 
CRSP 
Event day 
Categorical  variable  identifying  each event 
day. 
Kogan et al.  
2011/NBER 
SIZE The logarithim  of the number  of employees. COMPUSTAT 
GRANTLAG 
Difference in days between filing day and grant 
day. 
Kogan et al.  2011 / 
NBER 
PUB LAG 
Difference in days between filing day and 
publication day. 
Kogan et al.  2011 
/NBER 
ALLOW LAG 
Difference in days between filing day and 
mailing notice of allowance day 
Kogan et al.  2011/ 
USPTO 
† OECD Triadic Patent Families database, January 2013 
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A.2  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
 
TABLE A.2.1a – Patent grant. 60 days estimation window. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Median Max 
              
CAR (3 days) 17,193 0.000 0.000649 -0.00193 -0.0000231 0.00227 
CAR(5 days) 17,193 0.000 0.000852 -0.00257 -0.0000271 0.00296 
BCITES 16,764 17.10 26.07 1 10 541 
NCLAIMS 17,193 21.51 17.45 1 18 374 
GRANT LAG (DAYS) 17,193 879.7 418.5 151 790 3,658 
TPF 17,193 0.354 0.478 0 0 1 
FCITES 17,066 1.343 2.677 0 0.613 98.89 
HHI 15,176 0.222 0.180 0.0150 0.173 1 
SIZE 15,022 1.205 1.238 0 0.733 7.550 
PATSTOCK 17,193 221.2 928.9 0 21 16,790 
ANALYST 17,193 7.610 9.103 0 5 60 
Tobin's q 14,983 2.981 3.373 0.0197 2.136 137.4 
PHARMA 17,193 0.118 0.323 0 0 1 
ELECOMP 17,193 0.155 0.361 0 0 1 
NUMIPC 17,193 1.520 0.987 1 1 16 
EVENT 17,193 301.6 149.8 1 298 567 
COMPANY 17,193 1,339 825.8 1 1,272 2,946 
SIC 3 digits 17,193 131.2 54.93 1 131 263 
 
 
 
TABLE A.2.1b – Patent grant. 30 days estimation window. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Median Max 
       
CAR (3 days) 26,536 0.000 0.000659 -0.00203 -0.0000228 0.00227 
CAR(5 days) 26,536 0.000 0.000883 -0.00272 -0.0000215 0.00302 
BCITES 25,925 17.70 27.55 1 10 548 
NCLAIMS 26,536 21.42 16.90 1 18 374 
GRANT LAG (DAYS) 26,536 881.2 419.8 145 791 3,809 
TPF 26,536 0.357 0.479 0 0 1 
FCITES 26,340 1.355 2.710 0 0.604 98.89 
HHI 23,521 0.223 0.182 0.0150 0.172 1 
SIZE 23,291 1.408 1.308 0 0.981 7.550 
PATSTOCK 26,536 310.0 1,022 0 35 17,407 
ANALYST 26,536 8.814 9.748 0 6 60 
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TABLE A.2.1b Continued  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Median Max 
Tobin's q 23,233 2.924 3.105 0.00400 2.130 137.4 
PHARMA 26,536 0.110 0.313 0 0 1 
ELECOMP 26,536 0.170 0.376 0 0 1 
NUMIPC 26,536 1.519 0.988 1 1 16 
EVENT 26,536 309.2 148.4 1 308 568 
COMPANY 26,536 1,288 833.3 1 1,186 2,950 
SIC 3 digits 26,536 129.7 53.32 1 131 264 
 
TABLE A.2.2a - Orange book patents’ grant. 60 days estimation window. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Median Max 
              
CAR (3 days) 203 0.000 -0.000071 -0.000134 -0.000006 0.000187 
CAR(5 days) 203 0.000 0.000106 -0.000221 -0.000002 0.000275 
BCITES 198 19.95 33.63 1 9 232 
NCLAIMS 203 22.69 19.35 1 18 132 
GRANT LAG (DAYS) 203 881.9 499.5 200 757 2,841 
TPF 203 0.872 0.335 0 1 1 
FCITES 203 1.842 2.692 0 0.826 15.71 
HHI 183 0.0921 0.0676 0.0527 0.0634 0.484 
SIZE 182 2.022 1.788 0.0188 1.055 4.812 
PATSTOCK 203 1,493 2,097 0 111 8,534 
ANALYST 203 18.17 13.90 0 15 52 
NUMIPC 203 1.956 1.073 1 2 5 
Tobin's q 183 4.930 2.900 1.188 4.104 22.35 
EVENT 203 74.10 44.09 1 72 154 
COMPANY 203 24.59 15.23 1 21 55 
SIC 3 digits 203 4.961 2.435 1 4 11 
 
TABLE A.2.2b - Orange book patents’ grant. 30 days estimation window. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Median Max 
              
CAR (3 days) 232 -0.0000315 0.000498 -0.00127 -0.00000648 0.00126 
CAR(5 days) 232 -0.0000603 0.000736 -0.00208 -0.0000436 0.00217 
BCITES 226 18.44 31.80 1 9 232 
NCLAIMS 232 22.59 19.16 1 17 132 
GRANT LAG (DAYS) 232 845.6 481.0 200 741 2,841 
TPF 232 0.884 0.321 0 1 1 
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Table A2.2b - Continued 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Median Max 
FCITES 231 1.915 2.766 0 0.781 15.71 
HHI 212 0.0907 0.0655 0.0527 0.0634 0.484 
SIZE 211 2.122 1.803 0.0188 1.131 4.812 
PATSTOCK 232 1,601 2,129 0 307.5 8,534 
ANALYST 232 19.13 14.15 0 17 52 
NUMIPC 232 1.922 1.037 1 2 5 
Tobin's q 212 4.901 2.801 1.188 4.104 22.35 
COMPANY 232 24.08 15.05 1 21 55 
EVENT 232 80.66 47.72 1 79.50 168 
SIC 3 digits 232 5.026 2.497 1 4 11 
 
 
 
TABLE A.2.3a - Patent grant. 60 days estimation window. Canadian DrugBank 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Median Max 
              
CAR %(3 days) 61 0.00513 0.0430 -0.0680 0.000380 0.216 
CAR %(5 days) 61 0.00689 0.0602 -0.118 0.00807 0.319 
EVENT 61 30.34 17.36 1 30 60 
COMPANY 61 9 5.31 1 9 19 
 
 
TABLE A.2.3b - Patent grant. 30 days estimation window. Canadian DrugBank 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Median Max 
              
CAR %(3 days) 61 0.00529 0.0437 -0.106 -0.000156 0.216 
CAR %(5 days) 61 0.00449 0.0628 -0.194 0.0000534 0.304 
EVENT 61 30.34 17.36 1 30 60 
COMPANY 61 9 5.31 1 9 19 
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TABLE A.2.4a – Patent publication. 60 days estimation window. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Median Max 
        
CAR (3 days) 6,623 0.00000448 0.0000752 -0.000202 -0.00000119 0.000248 
CAR(5 days) 6,623 0.00000659 0.000108 -0.000269 -0.00000315 0.000344 
ANALYST 5,219 11.69 9.889 1 9 55 
BCITES 6,483 22.04 36.40 1 12 555 
NCLAIMS 6,623 22.18 17.26 1 19 271 
PUB LAG 
(DAYS) 
6,623 371.2 221.4 92 297 1,967 
TPF 6,623 0.365 0.481 0 0 1 
FCITES 6,379 1.061 3.474 0 0 118.9 
HHI 5,816 0.225 0.187 0.0135 0.169 1 
SIZE 5,787 1.385 1.334 0.00300 0.932 7.496 
PATSTOCK 6,623 480.6 1,992 0 49 45,616 
Tobin's q 5,755 2.750 2.104 0.00400 2.150 29.41 
NUMIPC 6,623 1.533 1.046 1 1 12 
COMPANY 6,623 823.2 500.6 1 808 1,745 
EVENT 6,623 185.1 72.15 1 197 282 
SIC 3 digits 6,623 94.65 41.03 1 98 179 
 
 
TABLE A.2.4b – Patent publication. 30 days estimation window. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Median Max 
        
CAR (3 days) 9,830 0.00000206 0.00000711 -0.000208 -0.00000138 0.000238 
CAR(5 days) 9,830 0.00000219 0.000101 -0.000284 -0.00000257 0.000327 
ANALYST 7,951 12.77 10.33 1 10 58 
BCITES 9,629 22.02 36.27 1 12 555 
NCLAIMS 9,830 22.14 16.79 1 19 271 
PUB LAG 
(DAYS) 
9,830 375.8 216.4 92 309 1,967 
TPF 9,830 0.373 0.484 0 0 1 
FCITES 9,494 1.061 3.316 0 0 118.9 
HHI 8,676 0.226 0.190 0.0135 0.163 1 
SIZE 8,632 1.564 1.392 0.00300 1.160 7.496 
PATSTOCK 9,830 619.5 2,036 0 73 45,616 
Tobin's q 8,583 2.703 2.018 0.00400 2.144 29.41 
NUMIPC 9,830 1.534 1.060 1 1 14 
COMPANY 9,830 794.7 503.1 1 765 1,748 
EVENT 9,830 187.3 70.52 1 198 283 
SIC 3 digits 9,830 95.28 39.92 1 100 181 
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TABLE A.2.5a – Patent allowance. 60 days estimation window. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Median Max 
        
CAR (9 days) 15,639 -0.0000133 0.00125 -0.00376 -0.0000433 0.00430 
CAR (13 days) 15,639 -0.000028 0.00153 -0.00458 -0.000047 0.00499 
CAR (10 days) 15,639 -0.0000101 0.00131 -0.00394 -0.0000399 0.00434 
BCITES 15,296 17.24 25.72 1 10 545 
NCLAIMS 15,639 21.61 18.08 1 18 596 
TPF 15,639 0.342 0.474 0 0 1 
FCITES 15,518 1.313 2.457 0 0.621 94.49 
ALLOW LAG 
(DAYS) 
15,639 697.7 411.5 18 609 3,697 
COMPANY 15,639 1,515 890.8 1 1,486 3,197 
EVENT 15,639 1,320 719.0 1 1,292 2,666 
SIC 3 digits 15,639 141.5 63.26 1 135 288 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE A.2.5b – Patent allowance. 30 days estimation window. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Median Max 
        
CAR (9 days) 21,332 -0.0000197 0.00137 -0.00429 -0.0000366 0.00443 
CAR (13 days) 21,332 -0.0000237 0.00172 -0.00522 -0.0000436 0.00544 
CAR (10 days) 21,332 -0.0000151 0.00146 -0.00448 -0.0000383 0.00478 
BCITES 20,861 17.60 26.62 1 10 545 
NCLAIMS 21,332 21.72 17.92 1 18 596 
TPF 21,332 0.352 0.478 0 0 1 
FCITES 21,169 1.335 2.502 0 0.614 94.49 
ALLOW LAG 
(DAYS) 
21,332 696.8 405.0 18 613 3,697 
COMPANY 21,332 1,508 897.3 1 1,469 3,205 
EVENT 21,332 1,373 722.4 1 1,354 2,713 
SIC 3 digits 21,332 134.8 54.84 1 135 264 
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TABLE A.2.6a – FDA announcements. 60 days estimation window. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Median Max 
              
CAR (3 days) 189 0.00374 0.0164 -0.00191 0.000148 0.114 
CAR (5 days) 189 0.00537 0.0221 -0.00220 0.000196 0.132 
COMPANY 189 33.21 25.04 1 25 87 
 
TABLE A2.6b – FDA announcements. 30 days estimation window. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Median Max 
              
CAR (3 days) 190 0.000590 0.00316 -0.00162 0.000127 0.0299 
CAR (5 days) 190 0.000554 0.00312 -0.00226 0.000116 0.0287 
COMPANY 190 33.21 24.97 1 25.50 87 
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A.3 CORRELATIONS 
 
TABLE A.3.1a – Correlation matrix. Patent grant. 60 days estimation window.  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) CAR (3 days) 1               
(2) CAR(5 days) 0.74 1              
(3) ANALYST 0 -0 1             
(4) BCITES -0.01 -0 -0 1            
(5) TPF 0.02 0.02 -0 0.13 1           
(6) NUMIPC 0.01 0.01 -0 -0 0.14 1          
(7) Tobin's q 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.12 0.05 1         
(8) PHARMA 0.01 0 -0 -0 0.27 0.27 0.15 1        
(9) ELECOMP -0.01 -0 0.04 -0 -0.1 -0.1 0.03 -0.2 1       
(10) GRANT LAG (DAYS) 0 0 0 0.15 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.1 -0 1      
(11) NCLAIMS 0 0.01 -0 0.13 0.06 0.01 0.03 -0 -0 0.11 1     
(12) FCITES 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.05 -0 0.01 -0.2 0.08 1    
(13) SIZE 0 -0 0.55 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 1   
(14) PATSTOCK 0 -0 0.28 -0 0.02 0.01 -0.1 -0 -0 -0.1 -0 -0 0.5 1  
(15) HHI 0 0.01 -0.1 0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0 -0 -0 -0 0.2 0 1 
Note: Number of observations: 17,193. All correlations are significant at 10% level except the ones in bold. 
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TABLE A.3.1b – Correlation matrix. Patent grant. 30 days estimation window.  
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) CAR (3 days) 1 
              
(2) CAR(5 days) 0.76 1 
             
(3) ANALYST 0.01 0 1             
(4) BCITES -0.01 0 -0.03 1 
           
(5) TPF 0 0.01 -0.05 0.13 1 
          
(6) NUMIPC 0 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.13 1          
(7) Tobin's q 0 0 0.08 0.03 0.12 0.05 1         
(8) PHARMA 0 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.26 0.26 0.17 1 
       
(9) ELECOMP -0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.1 -0.08 0.04 -0.16 1 
      
(10) GRANT LAG (DAYS) 0 0 0.01 0.14 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.09 -0.02 1      
(11) NCLAIMS 0 0.01 -0.02 0.13 0.05 0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.11 1     
(12) FCITES 0.01 0.01 0 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.01 -0.16 0.08 1 
   
(13) SIZE 0.01 0 0.54 -0.06 -0.11 -0.06 -0.19 -0.18 -0.09 -0.12 -0.08 -0.06 1 
  
(14) PATSTOCK 0 -0.01 0.29 -0.04 0.03 0.01 -0.06 0 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 0.49 1  
(15) HHI 0 0.01 -0.06 0 -0.06 -0.05 -0.1 -0.19 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.18 0.04 1 
Note: Number of observations: 26,536. All correlations are significant at 10% level except the ones in bold. 
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TABLE A.3.2a – Correlation matrix. Orange book patents’ grant. 60 days estimation window. 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) CAR (3 days) 1 
            (2) CAR(5 days) 0.86 1 
           (3) ANALYST 0.01 0.06 1 
          (4) BCITES -0.1 -0.1 -0.23 1 
         (5) TPF -0.02 0 0.05 -0.19 1 
        (6) NUMIPC 0.1 0.07 0.03 -0.08 0.09 1 
       (7) Tobin's q 0.08 -0.01 -0.02 -0.11 -0.02 0.02 1 
      (8) GRANT LAG (DAYS) 0.04 0 -0.07 0.37 -0.19 -0.01 -0.05 1 
     (9) NCLAIMS 0.03 -0.03 -0.05 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.08 1 
    (10) FCITES -0.1 -0.12 -0.06 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.15 -0.27 -0.04 1 
   (11) SIZE 0.03 0.07 0.75 -0.21 0.04 -0.03 -0.18 -0.11 -0.12 -0.1 1 
  (12) PATSTOCK 0.04 0.08 0.49 -0.19 0.12 -0.14 -0.2 -0.11 -0.11 -0.14 0.81 1 
 (13) HHI 0.02 0.02 -0.24 0 -0.16 -0.08 -0.16 0.07 -0.04 -0.07 -0.17 -0.1 1 
Note:Number of observations: 203. Correlations are significant at 10% level except the ones in bold. 
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TABLE A.3.2b – Correlation matrix. Orange book patents’ grant. 30 days estimation window. 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) CAR (3 days) 1             
(2) CAR(5 days) 0.74 1            
(3) ANALYST 0.05 0.09 1           
(4) BCITES 0 -0.02 -0.23 1          
(5) TPF -0.09 -0.04 0.06 -0.19 1         
(6) NUMIPC 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.07 0.09 1        
(7) Tobin's q 0.17 0.05 0.04 -0.1 -0.02 0.02 1       
(8) GRANT LAG (DAYS) 0.08 0.02 -0.09 0.38 -0.19 0.01 -0.03 1      
(9) NCLAIMS -0.04 -0.11 -0.04 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.08 1     
(10) FCITES -0.1 -0.12 -0.07 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.11 -0.26 -0.01 1    
(11) SIZE 0.06 0.03 0.75 -0.21 0.03 -0.07 -0.13 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 1   
(12) PATSTOCK 0 0 0.52 -0.19 0.13 -0.16 -0.17 -0.11 -0.1 -0.16 0.81 1  
(13) HHI 0 0.07 -0.26 0 -0.15 -0.09 -0.16 0.06 -0.05 -0.1 -0.22 -0.15 1 
Note: Number of observations: 232. Correlations are significant at 10% level except the ones in bold. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
94 
 
TABLE A.3.3a - Correlation matrix. Patent publication. 60 days estimation window. 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) CAR (3 days) 1 
            (2) CAR(5 days) 0.85 1 
           (3) ANALYST 0.02 0.02 1 
          (4) BCITES -0.01 0 -0.06 1 
         (5) TPF 0.01 0.01 -0.08 0.13 1 
        (6) NUMIPC 0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.14 1 
       (7) Tobin's q 0 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.14 0.07 1 
      (8) PUB LAG (DAYS) -0.14 -0.17 0.01 -0.08 -0.08 0.02 0.01 1 
     (9) NCLAIMS -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.08 1 
    (10) FCITES 0.05 0.06 0 0.1 0.07 -0.02 0.02 -0.1 0.04 1 
   (11) SIZE 0.01 0.01 0.5 -0.05 -0.15 -0.06 -0.25 0.01 -0.06 -0.04 1 
  (12) PATSTOCK 0 0 0.28 -0.04 -0.02 0.02 -0.08 0.03 -0.05 -0.03 0.43 1 
 (13) HHI -0.01 0 -0.03 -0.01 -0.08 -0.07 -0.11 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.2 0.02 1 
Note: Number of observations: 6,623. Correlations are significant at 10% level except the ones in bold. 
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TABLE A.3.3b - Correlation matrix. Patent publication. 30 days estimation window. 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) CAR (3 days) 1 
            
(2) CAR(5 days) 0.84 1 
           
(3) ANALYST 0.01 0.01 1           
(4) BCITES -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 1 
         
(5) TPF 0 0 -0.07 0.12 1 
        
(6) NUMIPC 0.02 0.02 0 -0.01 0.12 1        
(7) Tobin's q 0 0.02 0.1 0.05 0.13 0.05 1       
(8) PUB LAG (DAYS) -0.07 -0.1 0.02 -0.09 -0.09 0.02 0 1 
     
(9) NCLAIMS 0 0 -0.02 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.08 1 
    
(10) FCITES 0.04 0.05 -0.02 0.09 0.06 -0.01 0.01 -0.11 0.03 1    
(11) SIZE 0 0.01 0.5 -0.07 -0.14 -0.04 -0.26 0.02 -0.07 -0.05 1   
(12) PATSTOCK -0.01 -0.01 0.31 -0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.09 0.03 -0.05 -0.03 0.46 1 
 
(13) HHI 0 0 -0.04 -0.01 -0.09 -0.06 -0.13 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.21 0.04 1 
Note: Number of observations: 9,830. Correlations are significant at 10% level except the ones in bold. 
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TABLE A.3.4a – Correlation matrix. Patent allowance. 60 days estimation window. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(1) CAR (13 days) 1        
(2) CAR (9 days) 0.83 1       
(3) CAR (10 days) 0.88 0.84 1      
(4) BCITES -0.01 -0.01 0 1     
(5) NCLAIMS 0.01 0 0 0.12 1    
(6) FCITES 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.09 1   
(7) ALLOW LAG (DAYS) -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.14 0.1 -0.17 1  
(8) TPF 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.06 0.08 0.02 1 
Note: Number of observations: 15,639. Correlations are significant at 10% level except the ones in bold. 
 
 
TABLE A.3.4b – Correlation matrix. Patent allowance. 30 days estimation window. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(1) CAR (13 days) 1 
       (2) CAR (9 days) 0.85 1 
      (3) CAR (10 days) 0.89 0.86 1 
     (4) BCITES -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 1 
    (5) NCLAIMS 0.01 0 0 0.13 1 
   (6) FCITES 0 0 0 0.09 0.09 1 
  (7) ALLOW LAG (DAYS) 0 0 0 0.12 0.1 -0.17 1 
 (8) TPF 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.06 0.08 0.03 1 
Note: Number of observations: 21,332. Correlations are significant at 10% level except the ones in bold. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
97 
 
A.4 EXTENDED MODELS 
In this section, we explain the independent and control variables used in the 
estimation of extended models and present the results. 
A.4.1 Variables  
Appendix A.1 describes the independent and control variables and data 
sources.  Data on patent characteristics such as the number of patents cited 
(backward citations), the number of claims and the number of technological classes 
(international patent classification - IPC), in which the patent was classified by the 
USPTO, is readily available from the NBER dataset. The NBER dataset also 
includes the total number of citations received by a patent (forward citations). 
However, forward citations suffer a truncation problem, as all the future citations to 
a patent cannot be observed at any given date.  One option to overcome this bias, the 
one we adopt in this study, is to scale the raw patent citation count by the average 
citation count of all patents applied in the same year and in the same technology 
class (Hall et al., 2001, 2005; Acharya and Xu, 2014). Another patent related 
variable is a categorical variable that takes value equal one, and zero otherwise, if it 
is a triadic66 patent, which means that the patent is member of a triadic patent 
family67 (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2005). 
In the extended models, besides patent characteristics we also included a set 
of variables that capture firm and industry characteristics. Widely used as a measure 
of intangible assets, Tobin’s q measures the ratio of a firm’s value to the replacement 
cost of its tangible assets (Villalonga, 2004c). Thus, Tobin’s q was measured 
following the method proposed by Chung and Pruitt (1994), which does not require 
out-of-Compustat data.68 Since patents bestow a legal monopoly over the patented 
invention, industry competition levels may affect whether investors see a patent as 
an asset able to generate future cash flows. As a measure of industry competition we 
calculated the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) using Compustat sales data 
aggregated by 3-digit SIC code (Standard Industrial Classification). 
66 The patent was applied  for in the European  patent office (EPO),  in the Japanese  patent office 
(JPO) and granted  by the USPTO. 
67 OECD Triadic Patent Families database, January 2013. 
68 Chung  and  Pruitt (1994) found  that their  approximate q explains  at  least  96.6 % of the  variability 
of Tobin’s q - calculated  as in Lindenberg  and Ross (1981). 
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Further, we include two binary variables. One if the firm belong to the 
pharmaceutical industry (Pharma) and a second dummy indicates whether the firm 
belong to the electrical components and computer and office equipment industry 
(Elecomp).69    
 
A.4.2 Control Variables 
Event day dummies were included because calendar date clustering may 
generate contemporaneous correlations between residuals of different firms 
(Henderson Jr, 1990).  Campbell, Lo, and Mackinlay (1997) suggests that one 
approach to solve the problem of covariance between individual sample CARs, due 
to event clustering, is to include dummy variables for the event date. Event 
clustering occurs for patent application publication and for patent grant. Patent 
grants are published every Tuesday in the Official Gazette for Patents in electronic 
form while application publications are published every Thursday, electronically, by 
the USPTO. 
We control for patent stock as the stock70 of patents hold by the firm may 
underpin the value bear by a single patent. Gambardella et al. (2012) found that 
increasing portfolio size is associated with higher returns.  Moreover, Belenzon and 
Patacconi (2013) claim that large patent portfolio can signal firm’s technological 
strength. 
We also control for firm size (Gambardella et al., 2012; Bessen, 2008), as 
“the size of a firm is an important structural variable that affects the market returns 
on innovation” (Sood and Tellis, p. 445, 2009).  Firm size is measured as the log of 
the number of people employed 71 (Hegde et al., 2009) and can affect returns to a 
patent event by two mechanisms.   First, a larger firm may be more able to bear the 
innovation and patenting costs.  On the other hand, small firms, concentrated in 
technology intensive sectors, tend to have innovative advantage over large firms, 
employing skilled labor and mainly acting as technology supplier to larger firms 
endowed with downstream capacity (Acs and Audretsch, 1987). Additionally, 
accounting for industries heterogeneities we include industry fixed effects, measure 
69 Pharma takes value one if SIC code - 3 digits is 283 and zero otherwise; Elecomp takes value one 
if SIC code - 3 digits is 367 or 357 and zero otherwise. 
70 In this study, we consider patent stock as the number of granted patents applied for by a given 
firm. 
71 In order to have only positive numbers we measure size=ln(1+number of employees). 
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by industry SIC code 3 digits aggregation level. The models also control for the time 
lag between filing a patent and the grant (Grant lag), filing and patent publication 
(Pub lag), and filing and allowance (Allow lag).   
 
A.4.3 Empirical results 
We estimate extended models where the CAR is the dependent variable 
explained by patent and firm’s characteristics. In our results, we fail to find covariates 
that are consistently related to the CARs generated due to a patent grant event. These 
results are in line with the argument that the technical nature of the patent document 
makes it difficult to be interpreted by non-knowledgeable investors (Gu, 2005). 
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TABLE A.4.1 - OLS Estimation. Dependent Variable:  Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CAR). Patent grant 
  60 Days 30 days 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES (-1, 1) (-1, 1) (-2, 2) (-2, 2) (-1, 1) (-1, 1) (-2, 2) (-2, 2) 
                  
NUMANALYST 
 
-0.00000 
 
-0.00000 
 
0.00000 
 
-0.00000 
  
(0.00000) 
 
(0.00000) 
 
(0.00000) 
 
(0.00000) 
BCITES -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 
 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
TPF 0.00001 0.00001 0.00004* 0.00004* 0.00001 0.00001 0.00002 0.00002 
 
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
NUMIPC 0.00001 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 
 
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
Tobin's q 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 
 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
PHARMA 0.00029** 0.00029** 0.00004 0.00004 0.00010 0.00010 -0.00001 -0.00001 
 
(0.00011) (0.00011) (0.00013) (0.00013) (0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00008) (0.00008) 
ELECOMP 0.00030** 0.00030** 0.00008 0.00008 0.00008 0.00008 -0.00001 -0.00001 
 
(0.00011) (0.00011) (0.00013) (0.00013) (0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00008) (0.00008) 
GRANT LAG 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
NCLAIMS 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000+ 0.00000+ 
 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
FCITES 0.00000+ 0.00000+ 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
SIZE -0.00001 -0.00000 -0.00001* -0.00001+ 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
PATSTOCK -0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 
 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
HHI 0.00002 0.00002 0.00007 0.00007 0.00001 0.00001 0.00004 0.00004 
 
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00004) (0.00004) 
EVENT DAY FE Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
SIC3 FE Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant -0.00047** -0.00046** -0.00054*** -0.00053** -0.00031* -0.00031* -0.00058*** -0.00058*** 
 
(0.00014) (0.00015) (0.00016) (0.00017) (0.00014) (0.00014) (0.00010) (0.00010) 
         Observations 14,395 14,395 14,395 14,395 22,374 22,374 22,374 22,374 
R-squared 0.05858 0.05858 0.06735 0.06735 0.04357 0.04357 0.04801 0.04801 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include robust standard errors clustered by firm. Significance: *** 
p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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TABLE A.4.2 - OLS Estimation. Dependent Variable:  Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CAR). Orange book patents 
  60 Days 30 days 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES (-1, 1) (-1, 1) (-2, 2) (-2, 2) (-1, 1) (-1, 1) (-2, 2) (-2, 2) 
          
    NUMANALYST 
 
0.00000 
 
0.00000 
 
0.00001 
 
0.00001 
  
(0.00000) 
 
(0.00000) 
 
(0.00002) 
 
(0.00003) 
BCITES -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00001 0.00001 
 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
TPF -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00010+ -0.00010+ 0.00017 0.00019 -0.00028 -0.00027 
 
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00032) (0.00033) (0.00066) (0.00067) 
NUMIPC 0.00001+ 0.00001+ 0.00001 0.00001 0.00011 0.00011 0.00005 0.00004 
 
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00009) (0.00010) (0.00015) (0.00016) 
Tobin's q 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00004 0.00002 0.00003 0.00002 
 
(0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00005) (0.00007) (0.00010) (0.00013) 
GRANT LAG -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 
 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
NCLAIMS 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 
 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
FCITES -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00001** -0.00001* -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00003 -0.00004 
 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00005) (0.00006) 
SIZE -0.00002* -0.00003** -0.00005* -0.00005 -0.00006 -0.00010 -0.00016 -0.00021 
 
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00019) (0.00024) (0.00031) (0.00031) 
PATSTOCK 0.00000+ 0.00000 0.00000+ 0.00000* 0.00000 -0.00000 0.00000 -0.00000 
 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
HHI 0.00034 0.00031+ 0.00080** 0.00079** 0.00319 0.00298 0.00554 0.00534 
 
(0.00022) (0.00017) (0.00027) (0.00028) (0.00245) (0.00226) (0.00496) (0.00520) 
EVENT DAY FE Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
SIC3 FE Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant 0.00000 0.00003 0.00003 0.00003 -0.00153* -0.00134 -0.00143 -0.00125 
 
(0.00007) (0.00008) (0.00012) (0.00014) (0.00074) (0.00089) (0.00187) (0.00221) 
         Observations 179 179 179 179 206 206 206 206 
R-squared 0.98452 0.98601 0.98042 0.98046 0.91573 0.91834 0.86523 0.86629 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include robust standard errors clustered by firm. Significance: *** 
p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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TABLE A.4.3 - OLS Estimation. Dependent Variable:  Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CAR). Patent application publication 
 
  60 Days 30 days 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES (-1, 1) (-1, 1) (-2, 2) (-2, 2) (-1, 1) (-1, 1) (-2, 2) (-2, 2) 
         
NUMANALYST 
 
0.00000 
 
0.00000 
 
0.00000 
 
0.00000 
  
(0.00000) 
 
(0.00000) 
 
(0.00000) 
 
(0.00000) 
BCITES 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000** 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
TPF -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000+ 
 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
NUMIPC 0.00000** 0.00000** 0.00000* 0.00000* 0.00000** 0.00000** 0.00000* 0.00000* 
 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Tobin's q 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000* 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000* 0.00000* 
 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
PHARMA 0.00013*** 0.00001 0.00011*** 0.00003* -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00000 -0.00001 
 
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
ELECOMP 0.00013*** 0.00001 0.00010*** 0.00002+ -0.00000 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001 
 
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
PUB LAG -0.00000*** -0.00000*** -0.00000*** -0.00000*** -0.00000*** -0.00000*** -0.00000*** -0.00000*** 
 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
NCLAIMS 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
FCITES -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 
 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
SIZE -0.00000 -0.00000 0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 0.00000 -0.00000 
 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
PATSTOCK 0.00000 -0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 -0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
HHI -0.00001+ -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00002 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001 
 
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
EVENT DAY FE Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
SIC3 FE Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant 0.00004* 0.00015*** 0.00012*** 0.00021*** 0.00006*** 0.00006*** 0.00007*** 0.00008*** 
 
(0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00002) 
         
Observations 5,411 4,858 5,411 4,858 8,096 7,433 8,096 7,433 
R-squared 0.16953 0.17935 0.20225 0.21672 0.08889 0.09304 0.10318 0.10882 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include robust standard errors clustered by firm. Significance: *** 
p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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TABLE A4.4 - OLS Estimation. Dependent Variable:  Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CAR). Notice of allowance (NOA) 
 
  60 Days 30 days 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES (-2, 10) (-1, 7) (0, 9) (-2, 10) (-1, 7) (0, 9) 
              
BCITES -0.00000 -0.00000 0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000* -0.00000 
 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
NUMCLAIMS 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
FCITES 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 
 
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
ALLOW LAG 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
 
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
TPF 0.00006* 0.00006+ 0.00008** 0.00004+ 0.00004 0.00005* 
 
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00003) 
EVENT DAY FE Included Included Included Included Included Included 
SIC3 FE Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant 0.00071** 0.00087** 0.00053+ 0.00082*** 0.00102*** 0.00083* 
 
(0.00025) (0.00032) (0.00029) (0.00022) (0.00030) (0.00034) 
       Observations 15,178 15,178 15,178 20,703 20,703 20,703 
R-squared 0.19936 0.20979 0.20784 0.15847 0.16115 0.15966 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include robust standard errors clustered by firm. Significance: *** 
p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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A.5 CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS BY INDUSTRY 
 
The following tables display the average CARs generated due to a patent event – 
patent application publication, NOA, and patent grant, by industries: pharmaceutical 
and electronics and computer. Results are consistent with the results presented in the 
main analysis for all industries.  
 
 
TABLE A.5.1 - OLS Estimation. Dependent Variable:  Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CAR). Patent grant 
 
PANEL A 
  Pharmaceutical 
  Estimation Window = 30 days 
Event window CARs Observations 
(-1,1) -0.001% 2,921 
(-2,2) -0.002% 2,921 
Estimation Window = 60 days 
Event window CARs Observations 
(-1,1) 0.001% 2,028 
(-2,2) -0.000% 2,028 
  
 PANEL B 
  Eletronics and computers  
  Estimation Window = 30 days 
Event window CARs Observations 
(-1,1) -0.003%** 4,518 
(-2,2) -0.002% 4,518 
Estimation Window = 60 days 
Event window CARs Observations 
(-1,1) -0.001% 2,657 
(-2,2) -0.001% 2,657 
All regressions are estimated using robust standard errors clustered by event day. 
p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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TABLE A5.2 - OLS Estimation. Dependent Variable:  Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CAR). Patent application publication 
 
PANEL A 
  Pharmaceutical 
 Estimation Window = 30 days 
Event window CARs Observations 
(-1,1) 0.000% 1,122 
(-2,2) 0.000% 1,122 
Estimation Window = 60 days 
Event window CARs Observations 
(-1,1) 0.000% 775 
(-2,2) 0.001% 775 
  
 PANEL B 
  Eletronics and computers  
Estimation Window = 30 days 
Event window CARs Observations 
(-1,1) 0.000% 1,898 
(-2,2) 0.000% 1,898 
Estimation Window = 60 days 
Event window CARs Observations 
(-1,1) 0.000% 1,233 
(-2,2) 0.000% 1,233 
All regressions are estimated using robust standard errors clustered by event day. 
p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
106 
 
TABLE A5.3 - OLS Estimation. Dependent Variable:  Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CAR). Notice of Allowance (NOA) 
PANEL A 
  Pharmaceutical 
 Estimation Window = 30 days 
Event window CARs Observations 
(-1,7) -0.001% 2,361 
(-2,10) 0.001% 2,361 
(0,9) 0.001% 2,361 
Estimation Window = 60 days 
Event window CARs Observations 
(-1,7) -0.004% 1,804 
(-2,10) -0.004% 1,804 
(0,9) 0.000% 1,804 
  
 PANEL B 
  Eletronics and computers  
Estimation Window = 30 days 
Event window CARs Observations 
(-1,7) -0.002% 3,365 
(-2,10) -0.002% 3,365 
(0,9) -0.002% 3,365 
Estimation Window = 60 days 
Event window CARs Observations 
(-1,7) -0.004% 2,193 
(-2,10) -0.002% 2,193 
(0,9) -0.003% 2,193 
All regressions are estimated using robust standard errors clustered by event day. 
p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
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